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LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

OF" 


<T 


Class 


A  STUDY 


OF  THE 


TWELFTH  AMENDMENT 


OF  THE 


CONSTITUTION1  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


PRESENTED   TO   THE    FACULTY    OF    PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE 
UNIVERSITY   OF    PENNSYLVANIA 


BY 


LOLABEL  HOUSE 


IN    PARTIAL   FULFILLMENT   OF   THE    REQUIREMENTS   FOR    THE 
DEGREE    DOCTOR   OF    PHILOSOPHY 


PHILADELPHIA: 
IQOI. 


. 

A   STUDY 

OF   THE 

TWELFTH  AMENDMENT 

OF   THE 

CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


The  Convention  of  1787  had  several  sources  from  which  it 
might  draw  in  constructing  the  executive  department  of  the 
government.  These  were,  the  current  political  theories,  the 
plans  suggested  previous  to  its  meeting,  the  experience  under 
the  Confederation  and  the  precedents  found  in  the  State  consti- 
tutions. 

As  the  Confederation  dragged  on  year  after  year,  becoming 
more  hopelessly  inadequate  on  account  of  the  lack  of  sufficient 
powers  and  of  an  efficient  executive,  many  plans  were  suggested 
to  remedy  the  evils  so  apparent  to  the  most  indifferent  observer. 
In  each  of  these  the  question  of  the  executive  was  emphasized. 
One  of  the  first  definite  plans  for  a  Confederation  had  been  that 
of  Thomas  Paine,  outlined  in  "  Common  Sense."1  In  this,  after 
providing  for  a  Congress,  he  suggested  a  President,  chosen  from 
the  delegates  of  a  Colony  which  should  be  selected  by  lot.  In 
the  next  Congress  the  President  should  be  similarly  chosen,  the 
Colony  which  had  obtained  its  turn  being  omitted  from  the  draw- 
ing, till  the  whole  thirteen  had  had  their  proper  rotation.  .  As 
early  as  1783,  Pelatiah  Webster  pointed  out  very  clearly  and 
succinctly  the  defects  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  sug- 
gested an  entirely  new  plan  in  which  there  were  to  be  four  great 
Ministers  of  State,  a  financier,  a  Minister  of  War,  a  Minister  of 
State  and  a  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  all  of  whom  should  be 
1  "Common  Sense,"  pp.  30-31. 

127178 


required  to  give  a  written  opinion  on  all  proposed  bills.1  To- 
gether with  three  others,  named  by  Congress,  from  the  New 
England,  Middle  and  Southern  States  respectively,  they  should 
form  the  supreme  executive  body,2  presided  over  by  one  of  their 
number  appointed  by  Congress.  They  were  to  superintend  all 
executive  business  and  appoint  all  executive  officers,  but  how 
the  u  great  ministers  "  were  themselves  to  be  chosen  the  plan 
did  not  state. 

Noah  Webster's  plan3  in  1785  made  no  change  in  the  method 
of  choosing  the  President,  but  suggested  that  he  be  u  ex-officio 
supreme  magistrate,  clothed  with  authority  to  execute  the  laws 
of  Congress  in  the  same  manner  that  the  governors  of  the  States 
are  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  States." 

Madison4  wrote  in  his  notes  on  Jefferson's  "  Draught  of  a 
Constitution  for  Virginia :"  "An  election  by  the  Legislature  is 
liable  to  insuperable  objections.  It  not  only  tends  to  faction, 
intrigue  and  corruption,  but  leaves  the  Executive  under  the 
influence  of  an  improper  obligation  to  that  department.  An 

election  by  the  people  at  large, or  by  electors,  as  in 

the  appointment  of  the  Senate  in  Maryland,  or,  indeed,  by  the 
people,  thro'  any  other  channel  than  their  Legislative  represen- 
tatives, seems  to  be  far  preferable."  Though  this  was  written 
in  regard  to  the  State  Executive  it  exactly  expressed  his  opinion, 
as  afterwards  formulated,  in  regard  to  the  national  head.  In 
common  with  other  statesmen  of  the  day5  he  insisted  upon  the 
separation  of  the  functions  of  government,6  yet  such  was  the 
difficulty  of  the  subject  that  in  April,  1787,  he  wrote  to  Wash- 
ington that  though  a  National  Executive  was  a  necessity,  he 
had  scarcely  ventured  to  form  his  opinion  either  of  its  form  or 
authority.7 

The  Continental  Congress  had  been  struggling  with  the 
question  of  executive  administration  since  its  organization  in 
1775.  The  most  natural  step  at  first  was  to  appoint  committees 

1  "A  Dissertation  on  the  Political  Union  and  Constitution  of  the  Thirteen 
United  States  of  North  America,"  by  a  citizen  of  Philadelphia,  Pelatiah  Webster. 
First  published  in  1783  ;  republished  in  "  Political  Essays,"  1791,  p.  214. 

2  Ibid,  p.  221. 

3  "Sketches  of  American  Policy,"  Noah  Webster,  pp.  30-48. 

4  Madison's  Works  (Edition  of  1865),  I,  190. 

5  Hamilton's  Works  (1851),  II,  269-275. 

6  Madison's  Works,  I,  286.  7  Ibid,  290. 


to  carry  out  the  resolves  of  Congress,  but  as  the  field  of  opera- 
tions grew  wider  the  action  of  committees  proved  increasingly 
unsatisfactory.  Without  giving  a  detailed  account  of  the  de- 
velopment of  the  administrative  departments  of  War,  State, 
Treasury  and  Navy,  it  may  be  said  that  the  steady  evolution 
was  from  committees  of  Congress,  inefficient  and  desultory  in 
action,  through  boards,1  not  always  composed  of  members  of 
Congress,  more  efficient,  but  still  lacking  in  unity  of  action,  to 
single  officers2  with  subordinates.3  After  the  war  was  over  Con- 
gress passed  an  Act4  for  carrying  out  Art.  IX  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  providing  for  a  committee  of  one  delegate  from 
each  State  to  sit  between  Congresses.  The  powers  of  this  com- 
mittee were  much  limited  by  the  Act,  and  only  one  was  ever 
appointed.  It  was  instructed  to  prepare  an  ordinance  revising 
the  departments,  but  the  order  was  not  carried  out.  It  met  in 
Annapolis,  June  4,  1784,*  and  adjourned  till  June  26th,  u  to 
rest ;"  then  it  had  to  adjourn  day  after  day  till  July  8th,  for 
lack  of  a  quorum.  When  a  sufficient  number  was  finally  gotten 
together  no  business  of  importance  was  transacted.  The  members 
quarreled  among  themselves  and  animadverted  against  fate  for 
placing  them  there  in  the  heat.  On  August  i3th  there  is  the 

1  "  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,"  II,  130. 

2  In  1781. 

3  This  development  may  be  traced  through  the  following  references  to  the 
action  of  the  Continental  Congress  in  regard  to  the  matter  : 

State  Department. — I,  254  (Nov.  29,  17,75);  II,  113  (April  17,  1777);  VII; 
ii  (Jan.  10,  1781)  ;  VII,  219  (Feb.  22,  1782). 

War  Department.— -II,  198  (June  12,  1776;  Dec.  1776)  ;  III,  235  (July  18, 
1777)  ;  HI,  349  (Oct.  17,  1777)  ;  III,  351  (Oct.  17,  1777)  ;  III,  418  (Nov.  24,  1777)  ; 

III,  423  (Nov.  27,  1777)  ;  IV,  19  (Jan.   12,  1778);  IV,  449  (Oct.  29,   1778)  ;  VII, 
24  (Feb.  7,   1781)  ;  VII,  206  (Jan.  17,   1782)  ,  VII,  256  (April  10,   1782)  ;  X,  28 
(Jan.  27,  1785). 

Treasury  Department. — I,  173  (July  29,  1775);  I,  191  (Sept.  25,  1775);  II, 
64  (Feb.  17,  1776);  II,  274  (July  30,  1776);  III,  78  (March  25,  1777);  IV,  153  (April 
15,  1778);  IV,  294  (July  15,  1778);  IV,  310  (July  30,  1778);  IV,  331  (Aug.  12,  1778); 

IV,  403-407  (Sept.  26,  1778);  VII,  24  (Feb.  7,  1781);  VII,  143  (Sept.  7,   1781); 
VII,  30,  (Feb.  20,  1781);  VII,  144  (Sept,  11,  1781);  IX,  182  (May  28,  1784). 

Navy  Department.— -I,  203  (Oct.  13,  1775);  I,  242  (Nov.  25,  1775);  I,  269  (Dec. 
n,  1775);  I,  273  (Dec.  14,  1775);  II,  406  (Oct.  28,  1776);  II,  418  (Nov.  6,  1776). 

V,  297  (Oct.  28,  1779);  VII,  24  (Feb.  7,  1781);  VII,  143  (Sept.  7,  1781). 

Washington's  opinions  of  executive  power  may  be  found  by  reference  to  his 
writings.  (Putnam  edition),  VIII,  304  ;  IX,  14,  33,  75,  124,  131,  246  ;  XI,  186,  257. 

"Journals  of  Congress,"  IX,  184,  May  29,  1784. 
5  "Journals  of  Congress,"  IX,  Appendix,  p.  i. 


6 

plaintive  little  statement  that  whereas  certain  delegates  "  did  on 
Wednesday,  the  nth  day  of  the  present  month  of  August,  leave 
the  city  of  Annapolis  and  set  out  for  their  respective  homes,"  the 
Committee  was  reduced  to  an  insufficient  number  to  do  business, 
so  some  of  the  remaining  delegates  recommended  the  Secretary 
of  Congress  to  remove  the  papers  and  records  to  Philadelphia.1 
Thus,  until  the  next  meeting  of  Congress,  the  country  was  left 
without  a  government.  Such  experiences  caused  the  framers  of 
the  new  Constitution  to  regard  the  question  of  a  Chief  Magistrate 
as  one  of  paramount  importance. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  follow  the  tortuous  course  of  the  dis- 
cussion in  the  Federal  Convention,  concerning  the  election  of  the 
Executive,  without  causing  the  same  confusion  in  the  mind  of 
the  reader  which  seems  to  have  existed  in  that  of  the  Conven- 
tion itself.  The  novel  part  of  the  plan  evolved  was  the  intro- 
duction of  an  independent,  responsible  executive,  so  fatally 
lacking  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  In  the  Virginia  plan2 
introduced  into  the  Convention  May  aQth  by  Edmund  Randolph, 
the  seventh  Article  reads  :  "  Resolved,  That  a  national  Executive 
be  instituted  to  be  chosen  by  the  national  legislature  for  the  term 

of ,"  etc.  Art.  VIII  provides  for  a  Council  of  Revision3  to 

consist  of  the  Executive  and  a  convenient  number  of  the  judi- 
ciary. The  plan  entered  in  the  debates  as  that  of  Pinckney4  lays 
down  no  method  of  election. 

It  was  seen,  as  soon  as  the  discussion  began  in  the  Commit- 
tee of  the  Whole,  that  there  were  two  directly  opposing  concep- 
tions of  the  nature  and  function  of  the  executive,  and  it  was 
the  struggle  between  these  two  which  caused  the  prolonged 
indecision  concerning  the  method  of  election.  The  first  view 
was  drastically  expressed  by  Roger  Sherman,  who  said  he 
considered  the  executive  as  nothing  more  than  an  institu- 
tion for  carrying  into  effect  the  will  of  the  legislature ;  that 
the  person  or  persons  ought  to  be  appointed  by  and  account- 
able to  the  legislature  only,  as  it  was  the  depository  of  the 
supreme  will  of  society.  The  chief  exponents  of  the  opposite 

1  McMaster  :  "  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,"  I,  209-210. 

2  Elliot's  "Debates,"  V,  128. 

3  New  York  Constitution  of  1777,  Art.  III.     Poore's  "Charters  and  Consti- 
tutions," II,  1332. 

*  Elliot,  V,  131,  Appendix,  No.  2. 


view  were  Gotiverneur  Morris,  who  stated  later  that  one  great 
object  of  the  executive  is  to  control  the  legislature,  and  James 
Wilson,  who  said  he  was  almost  unwilling  to  declare  the  mode 
of  choice  he  wished,  for  fear  it  might  appear  chimerical  ;  stating, 
however,  that,  in  theory  at  least,  he  preferred  an  election  by  the 
people.  In  favor  of  this  he  could  cite  the  experience  under 
some  of  the  State  constitutions.  When  these  were  first  formed 
there  was  a  reaction  against  the  Colonial  executive.  The 
attempt  was  made  to  deprive  the  chief  magistracy  of  the  auto- 
cratic character  of  the  royal  governorship  without  divesting  the 
office  entirely  of  dignity  and  efficiency.  Connecticut  and 
Rhode  Island,  retaining  their  charters,  retained  the  election  by 
the  people ;  and,  of  the  newly  constructed  plans,  New  Hamp- 
shire, New  York  and  Massachusetts  provided  for  such  an  elec- 
tion. The  other  States  gave  the  power  to  the  legislative  body. 

The  question  of  number  next  showed  the  complete  diver- 
gence of  opinion  in  the  Convention.  Some  were  in  favor  of  allow- 
ing the  legislature  to  appoint  one  or  more  persons  as  experience 
might  dictate,1  and  unity  in  the  executive  was  characterized  as 
the  "  foetus  of  monarchy."  2  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  argued 
that  only  a  single  magistrate  could  give  the  necessary  energy, 
dispatch  and  responsibility,  and  that  such  unity  was  the  best 
safeguard  against  tyranny.3  Having  decided  that  it  would  be 
necessary  to  fix  the  powers  of  the  executive  as  a  guide  to  the 
number,  the  question  of  term  was  introduced.  A  motion  for 
three  years,  with  re-eligibility,  was  lost ; 4  then  Pinckney's 
motion  for  seven  years  was  carried. 

On  June  2d,  Wilson  brought  in,  in  a  modified  form,  his  idea 
of  popular  election  by  the  motion  "  That  the  executive  magis- 
tracy shall  be  elected  in  the  following  manner :  That  the  States 

be  divided  into districts,  and  that  the  persons  qualified  to 

vote  in  each  district  for  the  members  of  the  first  branch  of  the 
national  legislature  elect members  of  their  respective  dis- 
tricts to  be  the  electors  of  the  executive  magistracy ;  that  the 

said  electors  of  the  executive  magistracy  meet  at ,  and  they, 

or  any  -  -  of  them,  so  met,  shall  proceed  to  elect  by  ballot, 
but  not  out  of  their  own  body, person-  in  whom  the  execu- 
tive authority  of  the  national  government  shall  be  vested." 

1  Elliot,  V,  140.     Sherman.  2  Ibid,  V,  141.     Randolph. 

3  Ibid.     Wilson.  *  Ibid,  V,  142.     Wilson. 


There  was  a  direct  model1  for  this  method  of  election  in  the 
Constitution  of  Maryland*  of  I776.2  The  provision  was  that  the 
Senate  should  be  chosen  every  five  years  by  two  electors  from 
each  county,  elected  by  those  qualified  to  vote  for  Delegates,3 
which  electors  should  meet  at  Annapolis ;  twenty-four  were  to 
form  a  quorum,  and  they  were  to  elect  fifteen  Senators,  either 
out  of  their  own  body  or  from  the  people  at  large.  A  plurality 
only  was  required  to  elect,  and  if  there  should  be  a  tie,  a  second 
vote  should  be  taken  ;  if  that  failed,  the  election  should  be 
determined  by  lot.4  This  plan  was  proposed  as  a  part  of  the 
Virginia  Constitution  of  1776,  but  was  rejected.5  It  seems  to 
have  been  the  outgrowth  of  the  rather  aristocratic  ideas  of  the 
Maryland  Whigs  of  the  Revolution,6  and  its  success  was  very 
marked.  The  most  distinguished  men  of  the  State  were  elected 
Senators,7  and  this  wisdom  and  impartiality  of  the  College 
undoubtedly  had  weight  in  recommending  the  system8  both  in 
Maryland  itself  and  in  other  States.9  Madison  recommended  it 
to  Kentucky,10  and  Hamilton  cited  it  in  The  Federalists  having 
an  unrivalled  reputation.11  Nevertheless,  the  sentiment  in  favor 
of  it  in  the  Convention  needed  cultivating,  and  Wilson's  motion 
was  lost,12  only  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  voting  in  the  affirma- 
tive. The  motion  was  then  carried  for  an  election  by  the 
national  legislature  for  the  term  of  seven  years.  A  motion  for 
ineligibility  after  one  term  was  also  carried.13  ' 

The  Convention  then  went  back  to  the  undecided  question 

1  Elliot,  II,  128. 

2  Poore's  "Charters  and  Constitutions,"  1,  822. 

3  Arts.  XIV,  XV,  XVI. 

4  A  brief  history  of  the  adoption  of  this  system  may  be  found  by  tracing 
the  action  of  the  Convention  framing  the  Constitution,  in  "The  Convention  of 
Maryland,  1774,  1775,  1776,"  by  reference  to  pages  222,  228,  233,  251,  258,  259, 
275,  278,  295,  354. 

5  Madison's  Works,  I,  177.     Aug.  23,  1785. 

6  "The  Electoral  College  for  Maryland  and  the  Nineteen  Van  Buren  Elec- 
tors."    B.  C.  Steiner.     Am.  Histor.  Assoc.  Reports,  1895,  p.  129. 

I  Ramsay's  "  History  of  the  American  Revolution,"  I,  351,  352. 

8  "  Provisional  Government  of  Maryland,  1774-1777."    J.  A.  Silver.    Johns 
Hopkins  Un.  Studies,  XIII,  481,  527. 

9  McMahon's  "  History  of  Maryland,"  (1831),  I,  480 

10  Madison's  Works,  I,  186,  190. 

II  Federalist,  (Lodge's  Ed.),  LXIII,  398. 

12  Elliot,  V,  144- 

13  Ibid,  V,  149- 


of  number,  and  it  was  moved  that  the  blank  be  filled  with  "  one 
person."  Randolph  suggested  that  there  be  three  members,  to 
be  drawn  from  the  different  portions  of  the  country.1  This  idea 
of  balancing  the  sections,  Eastern,  Middle  and  Southern,  appears 
repeatedly  in  the  course  of  the  debates.  It  was  urged  that  the 
arguments  for  a  plural  executive  were  based  on  an  anticipated 
unpopularity  of  the  new  Constitution  rather  than  on  principle  ;2 
that  all  thirteen  of  the  States  had  agreed  upon  a  single  execu- 
tive, and  that  a  plural  one  would  foment  uncontrolled,  continued 
and  violent  animosities.  The  decision  in  favor  of  a  single 
executive  was  carried  by  a  vote  'of  seven  States  to  three.3 

After  some  discussion  of  the  veto  power,  in  which  an  abso- 
lute veto,  a  suspensive  veto  and  no  veto  at  all  were  each  advo- 
cated, a  vote  was  taken  on  the  first  and  last  suggestions,  result- 
ing in  their  unanimous  rejection  ;  and  the  revisionary  power, 
subject  to  overruling  by  two-thirds  of  both  branches  of  the 
legislature,  was  decided  upon.  It  is  interesting  that  this  power 
should  have  been  given  at  all,  for,  in  the  States,  only  Massachu- 
setts had  given  her  Governor  a  veto. 

The  matter  now  seemed  settled  ;  there  was  to  be  a  single 
executive,  chosen  by  the  national  legislature  for  a  term  of  seven 
years  and  ineligible  thereafter,  having  a  revisionary  check  on 
legislation.  But  the  leven  of  dissatisfaction  with  such  a  mode 
was  steadily  working  and  produced  no  less  than  seventeen  dif- 
ferent suggestions  before  the  Convention  finally  adopted  the 
principle,  in  part,  of  Wilson's  motion  of  June  2d.  After  a 
vote  for  the  reconsideration  of  the  mode  of  election,  Gerry 
moved 4  "  that  the  national  executive  should  be  elected  by 
the  executives  of  the  States,  whose  proportion  of  votes  should 
be  the  same  with  that  allowed  to  the  States  in  the  elec- 
tion of  the  Senate."  Showing  the  danger  of  corruption  and 
intrigue  in  an  election  by  the  legislature,  he  drew  the  analogy  to 
the  principle  observed  in  electing  the  other  branches  of  the 
government ;  the  first  branch  being  chosen  by  the  people  of  the 
States  and  the  second  by  the  State  legislatures,  it  seemed  to  him 
fitting  that  the  executive  should  be  appointed  by  the  State 
executives.  Randolph  spoke  against  the  plan,  saying  that  the 
State  executives  would  neither  make  a  good  choice  nor  feel  an 
1  Ibid.  Randolph.  2  Ibid,  V,  150.  3  Ibid,  V,  151.  4  Ibid,  V,  174. 


IO 

interest  in  supporting  the  national  executive  ;  he  made  the  strik- 
ing statement:  u  They  will  not  cherish  the  great  oak  which  is 
to  reduce  them  to  shrubs."  1  Gerry's  motion  was  negatived  by 
a  large  majority. 

When  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  rose  the  section  out- 
lined above  was  part  of  the  plan  reported,2  but  it  was  postponed 
in  order  to  give  an  opportunity  for  other  schemes  to  be  pre- 
sented. Patterson  introduced  his  plan,3  which  contemplated 
merely  a  revision  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation  and  provided 
for  a  plural  executive,  elected  by  Congress  for  -  -  term  of  years, 
not  re-eligible  and  removable  upon  application  of  a  majority  of 
the  State  executives.  Again  the  Convention  went  into  a  Com- 
mittee of  the  Whole  for  the  discussion  of  this  plan,  and  during 
the  debates  upon  it  Hamilton  read  a  sketch  of  a  form  of  govern- 
ment 4  which  he  submitted,  not  for  action  but  to  give  a  correct 
view  of  his  ideas  and  to  suggest  amendments  he  should  prob- 
ably propose  to  the  plan  introduced  by  Randolph.  In  Hamil- 
ton's plan,  as  given  in  the  Madison  Papers,  there  was  to  be  a 
Governor,  to  serve  during  good  behavior,  elected  by  electors 
chosen  by  the  people  in  election  districts  already  provided  for 
the  election  of  Senators.  In  this  we  have  the  first  mention  of  a 
successor,  in  case  of  death  or  disability  ;  the  President  of  the 
Senate  was  to  exercise  power  until  a  new  election.  In  Hamil- 
ton's Works  5  there  is  a  short  sketch  very  much  like  this,  but 
differing  in  the  essential  point  of  the  method  of  election.  This 
provides  that  it  should  be  by  electors  chosen  by  electors  chosen 
by  the  people  ;  or  by  electors  chosen  by  the  respective  legisla- 
tures. There  is  also  an  elaboration  of  the  plan  6  entitled  "  First 
draft  by  Hamilton,  1787."  This  proposed  that  the  people  of 
each  State,  with  certain  property  qualifications,  should  elect  a 
set  of  men  equal  in  number  to  the  State's  representation  in  Con- 
gress, to  be  called  the  "first  electors."  These  should  meet  in 
their  respective  States,  vote  for  a  president  and  make  two  lists 
of  their  ballots,  which  lists  should  be  delivered  to  two  men 
elected  by  them  as  the  "second  electors,"  and  to  Congress. 
The  "  second  electors  "  from  all  the  States  should  then  meet  at 

1  Ibid,  V,  175.       2  Ibid,  V,  189.       3  Ibid,  V,  192.     June  15.       4  Ibid,  V,  205. 
June  18. 

5  Edited  by  J.  C.  Hamilton  (1851),  II,  393. 

6  Ibid,  p.  399. 


II 

an  appointed  place  and  open  all  the  lists.  If  any  one  person 
had  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  first  electors  he  should 
be  President,  but  if  no  person  had  a  majority  the  second 
electors  should  vote  for  one  of  the  three  highest.  If  they  could 
not  center  a  majority  on  any  one  person  on  the  first  day  of  their 
meeting,  the  one  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  of  the 
first  electors  should  be  President.  This  plan  was  evidently  not 
presented  in  the  Convention,1  and  as  it  agrees  with  the  shorter 
one  in  providing  a  double  set  of  electors,  it  is  probable  that  the 
draft  in  the  Madison  Papers  is  incorrect. 

Patterson's  plan  having  been  rejected,  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole  rose  and  the  Convention  took  the  Virginia  plan  into  con- 
sideration again.  July  iyth  it  was  agreed  without  division  that 
there  should  be  a  single  executive,2  but  the  question  of  the  mode 
of  election  called  forth  a  speech  from  Gouverneur  Morris,  who 
strongly  deprecated  the  election  by  the  legislature,  declaring 
that  it  ought  to  be  by  the  people  at  large,  by  the  freeholders  of 
the  country.  He  made  a  motion  to  that  effect,  which  was  lost,3 
only  Pennsylvania  voting  for  it.  Sherman  thought  that  the 
sense  of  the  nation  would  be  better  expressed  by  the  legislature 
than  by  the  people  at  large ;  Pinckney  thought  the  people 
would  be  misled  by  demagogues ;  Williamson  conceived  that 
there  was  the  same  difference  between  an  election  by  the  people 
and  by  the  legislature  as  between  an  appointment  by  lot  and  by 
choice,  while  Mason  ventured  the  statement4  that  it  would  be 
as  unnatural  to  refer  the  choice  to  the  people  as  it  would  be  to 
refer  a  trial  of  colors  to  a  blind  man.  During  the  discussion  of 
the  motion  Wilson  mentioned  the  expedient  afterwards  adopted, 
suggesting  that  if  a  popular  election  should  not  result  in  a  deci- 
sion they  might  use  the  plan  of  Massachusetts  of  referring  the 
eventual  choice  to  the  legislature. 

This  plan  was  not  confined  to  Massachusetts,  as  may  be  seen 
by  a  reference  to  the  State  Constitutions.  The  Vermont  Consti- 
tution of  1777  r>  referred  an  undecided  vote  to  the  joint  ballot  of 
the  Council  and  Assembly  ;  the  Massachusetts  Constitution  of 
1780°  contained  a  similar  but  more  elaborate  provision;  the 

1  Hamilton's  Works  (Putnam  Edition),  I,  334.     Note. 

12  Elliott,  V,  322. 

3  Ibid,  V,  324.  *  Ibid. 

5  Poore's  "Charters  and  Constitutions,"  II,  1862.     Sec.  XVII. 

6  Ibid,  I,  964-965,  Chap  II,  Sec.  I,  Art.  III. 


12 

portion  respecting  the  election  of  the  executive  in  the  New 
Hampshire  Constitution  of  1784  l  seems  to  have  been  modeled  on 
that  of  Massachusetts. 

As  soon  as  Morris'  motion  for  popular  election  was  rejected, 
Luther  Martin  moved  that  the  executive  be  chosen  by  electors 
appointed  by  the  several  State  legislatures,  but  this  was  also  lost 
and  the  question  on  the  words  "to  be  chosen  by  the  national 
legislature  "  passed  unanimously  in  the  affirmative.  The  ques- 
tion of  term  was  postponed,  the  duties  were  passed  according  to 
the  Resolutions  and  it  was  voted  to  strike  out  the  clause  "to  be 
ineligible  a  second  time."  2 

That  this  unanimous  vote  on  the  mode  of  election  was  not 
a  settlement  of  the  question  was  mainly  due  to  the  feeling  of 
the  majority  of  the  Convention  that  the  executive  should  be  re- 
eligible,  which  was  obviously  undesirable,  from  the  standpoint 
of  executive  independence,  should  he  be  elected  by  the  legisla- 
ture. One  member  moved  that  since  ineligibility  had  been  re- 
moved, the  term  be  made  for  good  behavior.  Four  States  voted 
for  the  motion,  as  Madison  says  in  a  note  to  his  Journal,  to  alarm 
those  attached  to  a  dependence  of  the  executive  on  the  legisla- 
ture. An  attempt  to  change  the  seven  year  term  failed,3  and  the 
Convention  decided  to  reconsider  the  vote  on  the  ineligibility 
clause. 

In  the  debate  which  followed  we  see  again  the  wide  diver- 
gence between  the  political  theories  of  prominent  members. 
One  party  urged  a  strong,  independent,  re-eligible  executive  as  a 
check  to  legislative  tyranny  and  an  appointment  by  the  people, 
or  at  least  by  electors  chosen  by  them.  The  other  contended 
that  if  he  were  chosen  by  the  legislature,  the  only  proper  mode, 
he  should  be  ineligible  to  prevent  intrigue.  Patterson  proposed 
that  the  executive  should  be  appointed  by  electors  chosen  by  the 
States  in  a  ratio  that  would  allow  one  elector  to  the  smallest  and 
three  to  the  largest  States.  Madison  spoke  in  favor  of  the  elec- 
toral system,  as  the  best  substitute  for  an  election  by  the  people 
at  large,  which  could  not  be  used,  as  the  Southern  States  had 
such  a  large  unenfranchised  population.  Gerry  again  tried  to 
bring  in  the  State  executives  by  proposing  that  the  election  be 
by  electors  chosen  by  them.  A  formal  motion  for  reconsidering 
1  Ibid,  II,  1287.  2  Eliiot,  V,  325.  3  Ibid,  V,  327. 


the  Constitution  of  the  executive  having  passed  unanimously,  a 
motion  was  made  l  embodying  Patterson's  suggestion  that  the 
executives  u  be  chosen  by  electors  appointed  by  the  States  in 
the  following  ratio,  to  wit :  one  for  each  State  not  exceeding  two 
hundred  thousand  inhabitants ;  two  for  each  above  that  number 
and  not  exceeding  three  hundred  thousand,  and  three  for  each 
State  exceeding  three  hundred  thousand."  The  question  was 
divided,  the  parts  concerning  the  choice  of  electors  by  the  State 
legislatures  being  carried,  that  regarding  the  ratio,  postponed. 
The  Convention  refused  to  adopt  a  suggestion  to  make  the 
executive  ineligible  a  second  time,  and  changed  the  term  from 
seven  to  six  years. 

A  glance  at  the  State  Constitutions  will  show  that  the  prac- 
tice had  been  to  give  the  executive  a  short  term,  no  State  having 
a  longer  period  than  three  years,  the  majority  having  one.2  This 
precedent,  together  with  the  desire  to  make  the  term  short 
enough  for  re-eligibility  and  the  dread  of  anything  approaching 
monarchy,  was  probably  the  motive  prompting  the  shortening 
of  the  term  to  the  four  years  it  finally  reached. 

On  July  aoth,  Gerry  proposed  that  there  be  twenty-five 
electors  in  the  following  ratio :  New  Hampshire  i,  Rhode 
Island  i,  Massachusetts  3,  Connecticut  2,  New  York  2,  New 
Jersey  2,  Pennsylvania  3,  Delaware  i,  Maryland  2,  Virginia  3, 
North  Carolina  2,  South  Carolina  2,  Georgia  i.  This  ratio  was 
objected  to  as  being  unjustly  rigid,  and  an  amendment  was  offered 
that  in  the  future  it  should  be  regulated  by  the  respective  repre- 

1  Ibid,  V,  338.     Ellsworth. 

2  Compiled  from  Poore's  "Charters  and  Constitutions." 


STATE 

DATE  OF 
CONST. 

TERM 

LIMITATIONS 

New  Hamp. 

1784 

yr. 

Vermont 

1777 

yr. 

Massachusetts 

1780 

yr. 

Connecticut 

1662 

i  yr. 

Rhode  Island 

I663 

yr. 

New  York 

1777 

3  Yr- 

Pennsylvania 

1776 

yr. 

New  Jersey 

1776 

yr. 

Delaware 

1776 

3  Yr- 

Ineligible  for  3  years. 

Maryland 

1776 

i  yr. 

Ineligible  for  4  yrs.,  after  3  successive  terms. 

Virginia 

1776 

i  yr. 

Ineligible  for  4  yrs.,  after  3  successive  terms. 

North  Carolina 
South  Carolina 

1776 
1778 

i  yr. 
2  yr. 

Ineligible  3  years  in  6. 
Ineligible  till  4  years. 

Georgia 

1777 

lyr. 

Ineligible  for  more  than  i  year  out  of  3. 

sentations  in  the  first  branch  of  Congress.  There  is  no  record  of 
the  disposition  of  this  motion,  and  Gerry's  ratio  was  carried.  Pro- 
vision was  then  made  that  the  electors  should  neither  be  members 
of  the  national  Legislature,  United  States  officers,  nor  eligible  to 
the  chief  magistracy,  and  that  they  should  be  paid  out  of  the 
national  treasury. 

A  feeling  of  uncertainty  and  discontent  centered  around  this 
last  decision,  and  soon  a  reconsideration  was  carried  and  a  motion 
was  made  to  reinstate  the  election  by  the  legislature.  William- 
son was  for  going  back  to  the  original  ground  and  reconsidering 
the  number  also,  and  he  declared  himself  in  favor  of  a  triple 
executive  taken  from  the  three  sections  of  the  country.  Gerry 
moved  that  the  legislatures  of  the  States  should  vote  by  ballot 
for  the  executive  in  the  same  proportions  that  had  been  proposed 
for  the  choice  of  electors ;  that  in  case  a  majority  should  not 
center  on  the  same  person  the  first  branch  of  the  legislature 
should  choose  two  of  the  four  candidates  having  the  greatest 
number  of  votes,  and  out  of  these  the  second  branch  should 
choose  the  executive.  This  motion  being  out  of  order  no  vote 
was  taken  on  it.  The  motion  to  leave  the  election  to  the  na- 
tional legislature  was  then  carried,1  making  the  third  time  that 
the  Convention  had  voted  in  the  affirmative  for  this  method. 
Nevertheless,  the  question  of  ineligibility  and  term  again  divided 
the  body.  After  listening  to  suggestions  of  eight,  eleven  and 
fifteen  years,  King  ironically  proposed  twenty — "  as  the  medium 
life  of  princes." 

Wilson,  in  an  effort  to  compromise,  made  the  suggestion,2 
afterwards  put  into  a  motion,  that  the  election  should  be  made 
by  a  small  number,  not  more  than  fifteen,  to  be  drawn  from  the 
national  legislature  by  lot ;  these  should  immediately  retire  and 
make  the  choice  without  separating.  No  vote  was  taken  on 
this.  Gouverneur  Morris  again  denounced  the  election  by  the 
legislature  as  the  worst  possible  mode.  At  this  point  he  made 
the  first  mention  of  the  probable  influence  of  party  division  on 
the  executive,  who  would  necessarily  u  be  more  connected  with 
one  than  with  the  other."  Another  compromise  to  secure  inde- 
pendence of  the  executive  was  attempted  in  the  motion3  "  that 
the  executive  be  appointed  by  the  legislature,  except  when  the 

1  Elliot,  V,  359,     Vote  :  7  to  4. 

2  Ibid,  V,  360.  3  Ibid,  V,  363.     Ellsworth. 


magistrate  last  chosen  shall  have  continued  in  office  the  whole 
term  for  which  he  was  chosen  and  be  re-eligible ;  in  which  case 
the  election  shall  be  made  by  electors  appointed  by  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  States  for  that  purpose."  This  anomalous  method 
was  rejected,  and  Gerry  re-introduced  his  favorite  idea  of  an 
election  by  the  State  executives.  It  was  modified  by  the  pro- 
posal that  they  receive  the  advice  of  their  councils,  or,  in  case 
there  were  no  councils,  by  electors  chosen  by  the  legislatures, 
the  executives  to  vote  in  a  fixed  ratio.  This  also  failed  to  come 
to  a  vote. 

Madison  now  took  up  the  question  and  viewed  it  from  all 
sides,  showing  the  dangers  in  the  proposed  methods,  and  again 
declared  his  preference  for  direct  election  by  the  people,  avow- 
ing his  willingness  to  make  the  sacrifice  such  an  election  would 
entail  upon  the  South.  He  was  answered  by  the  statement  that 
a  popular  election  would  be  impossible,  as  the  small  States 
would  have  no  influence  in  it.  Gouverneur  Morris  spoke 
strongly  against  the  rotation  which  an  appointment  by  the 
legislature,  with  ineligibility,  would  make  necessary.  He 
seemed  to  be  the  only  one  having  any  idea  of  the  influence 
party  would  have  on  the  question,  and  he  pointed  out  the  fact 
that  "  a  change  of  men  is  ever  followed  by  a  change  of  meas- 
ures." 

It  was  suggested  that  the  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  small 
States  in  a  popular  election  might  be  obviated  by  each  man's 
voting  for  three  men,  two  of  whom  should  be  from  some' other 
State  than  his  own.  Morris  suggested  that  two  would  be  a 
more  convenient  number,  and  this  was  followed  by  the  "  favor- 
ite son  "  idea  in  the  proposal1  that  the  people  of  each  State 
choose  its  best  citizen  ;  and,  out  of  the  thirteen  names  thus 
selected,  an  executive  might  be  chosen,  either  by  the  national 
legislature  or  by  electors  appointed  by  it.  After  recapitulating 
the  various  schemes  which  had  been  proposed,  Mason  moved 
that  the  original  report  of  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  be 
reinstated,  and  the  motion  was  carried.  This  vote  for  the  fourth 
time  to  adopt  what  seemed  to  him  so  objectionable  a  provision 
caused  Morris  to  reiterate  his  arguments  against  the  whole  para- 
graph. Nevertheless,  it  was  referred  to  the  Committee  for 
1  Ibid,  V,  367. 


i6 

drafting,  and  was  reported  back  to  the  Convention  on  August  6th, 
slightly  different  in  form,  but  the  same  in  substance.  In  addi- 
tion, it  was  provided  that  the  President  of  the  Senate  should 
succeed  in  case  of  death  or  disability. 

An  effort  was  now  made  to  provide  a  Council,  which  had 
not  met  with  general  favor  in  the  Convention,  though  the  pre- 
cedents reached  back  to  the  earliest  Colonial  times.  In  spite  of 
strong  opposition,  a  committee,  to  which  the  subject  was  referred, 
brought  in  a  report  embodying  some  of  the  ideas  previously 
submitted  by  Gouverneur  Morris,1  recommending  a  Council,  to 
consist  of  the  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Speaker  of  the 
House,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  princi- 
pal officer  in  the  respective  departments  of  foreign  affairs, 
domestic  affairs,  war,  marine  and  finance.  This  Council  was  to 
be  merely  advisory.  No  vote  was  taken  on  this  part  of  the 
report,  and  on  August  3ist  it  was  referred  to  the  Committee  of 
Eleven  appointed  for  final  drafting. 

In  the  meantime  debate  was  going  on  in  regard  to  the  ques- 
tion of  a  joint  ballot  in  the  election  of  the  executive  by  the 
legislature.  Such  a  ballot  would  virtually  give  the  appoint- 
ment to  the  House,  and  so  deprive  the  small  States,  as  such,  of 
their  influence.  It  was  moved2  to  insert  "  people "  in  the 
place  of  u  legislature  ;"  but  this  was  rejected  and  the  joint  ballot 
was  finally  decided  upon.  A  motion  that  the  legislature  vote  by 
States  was  lost.  Again  Morris  protested  against  the  election  by 
the  legislature,  dwelling  upon  the  dangers  of  such  a  mode  and 
ending  by  again  moving  the  election  by  electors  chosen  by  the 
people  of  the  States.  His  motion  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  five  to 
six.  The  question  of  the  electoral  system  was  put  u  as  an 
abstract  question "  and  was  lost,  the  States  being  equally 
divided.3 

Objections  were  raised  to  the  President  of  the  Senate  as  the 
eventual  successor,  on  account  of  his  part  in  the  election  of  the 
President.  This  introduced  for  the  first  time  the  question  of  a 
Vice-President ;  but  the  desirability  of  creating  such  an  office 
was  regarded  as  undetermined  when  it  was  referred  to  the  Com- 
mittee of  Eleven  on  August  3ist. 

The  question  of  succession  in  case  of  death  or  disability  of 
1  Ibid,  V,  446.  2  Ibid,  V,  472.  Carroll.  3  Ibid,  V,  474- 


I? 

the  executive  was  such  an  important  one  that  not  a  single  State 
Constitution  had  neglected  it.1 

When  the  Committee  reported  on  September  4th,  to  the 
surprise  of  many  in  the  Convention  the  plan  for  the  executive 
was  entirely  different  from  that  referred  to  it,  the  electoral 
system  as  finally  adopted  being  reported,  with  the  provision, 
however,  that  the  eventual  election  should  be  by  the  Senate. 
When  a  particular  explanation  and  discussion  of  the  change 
was  called  for,  Morris  answered  categorically  :  there  was  danger 
of  intrigue  and  faction  in  an  appointment  by  the  legislature, 
inconvenience  in  the  necessary  ineligibility  and  difficulty  in 
establishing  a  court  of  impeachment  other  than  the  same  body 
which  was  to  elect  the  executive ;  nobody  was  satisfied  with 
that  method  ;  many  wanted  immediate  choice  by  the  people ; 
and,  finally,  there  was  the  all-embracing  reason — the  indispen- 
sable necessity  of  making  the  executive  independent  of  the 
legislature.  The  chief  objection  to  the  report  was  made  con- 
cerning the  provision  in  regard  to  the  Senate,  which  would 
have  a  preponderance  of  power.  Objections  were  also  raised  to 
the  number,  five,  from  which  the  Senate  had  to  select  in  case  of 
a  non-election  by  the  electors.  Some  considered  it  too  large  ; 
others  suggested  as  many  as  thirteen.  A  motion  was  made2  to 

1  New  Jersey,  1776.     Lieutenant  Governor  chosen  by  the  Council. 
Massachusetts,  1780.     Lieutenant  Governor  chosen  by  people  in  same  way 

as  Governor. 

New  Hampshire,  1784.     Senior  Senator  acted  in  absence  of  Governor. 

New  York,  1777.  Deputy  Governor  chosen  by  people  in  same  way  as  Gov- 
ernor. 

Pennsylvania,  1776.  Vice- President  chosen  by  joint  ballot  of  Assembly  and 
Council,  from  Council. 

Rhode  Island,  1663.    Deputy  Governor  chosen  as  the  Governor,  by  people. 

South  Carolina,  1778.     Lieutenant  Governor  chosen  by  Assembly. 

Vermont,  1777.  Lieutenant  or  Deputy  Governor  chosen  by  people  in  same 
way  as  Governor. 

Virginia,  1776.     President  of  the  Council  to  act  as  Lieutenant  Governor. 

Connecticut,  1667.  Deputy  Governor  chosen  as  Governor,  by  people. 

Georgia,  President  of  the  Executive  Council  to  exercise  powers  of  Gover- 
nor in  his  absence. 

Maryland,  1776,  The  first  named  of  the  Council  to  act  till  he  could  call 
Assembly. 

North  Carolina,  1776.  Speaker  of  the  Senate  and  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Commons  to  succeed  in  turn  till  new  election. 

Delaware,  1776.  Speaker  of  the  Legislative  Council  and  Speaker  of  House 
to  succed  in  turn  till  new  election. 

2  Elliot,  V,  512.     Rutledge,  Sept.  5. 


i8 

go  back  to  the  plan  of  appointment  by  the  legislature  ;  but  the 
arguments  against  this  had  caused  such  a  change  of  sentiment 
that  the  motion  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  two  to  eight.  The  oppo- 
sition then  centered  around  the  eventual  election  by  the  Senate, 
and  Wilson  attempted,  without  success,  to  substitute  the  word 
"legislature."  Gerry  suggested  that  six  Senators  and  seven 
Representatives,  chosen  by  joint  ballot  of  both  Houses,  form  the 
final  electing  body.  This  was  not  taken  up,  and  on  the  next 
day  he  suggested  that,  in  case  of  no  majority,  if  the  President 
were  again  a  candidate,  the  second  election  should  be  made  by 
the  legislature,  instead  of  the  Senate.  Sherman  was  of  the 
opinion  that,  if  the  legislature  had  the  eventual  appointment, 
it  ought,  in  justice  to  the  small  States,  to  vote  by  States. 
Hamilton  was  in  favor  of  letting  the  highest  number  of  ballots, 
whether  a  majority' or  not,  elect  the  President,  in  order  to  keep 
it  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Senate,  and  Madison  moved  that  one- 
third  of  the  electoral  vote  should  elect.2  The  vote  was  strongly 
in  favor  of  referring  the  eventual  election  to  the  Senate ;  yet, 
when  it  was  moved3  that  the  House,  voting  by  States,  should  be 
substituted,  the  motion  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  ten  to  one. 
The  principle  involved  seems  to  have  been  the  anxiety  to  pre- 
serve the  weight  of  the  small  States.  To  safeguard  this  method, 
it  was  decided  that  a  quorum  for  the  purpose  should  consist  of  a 
member  or  members  from  two-thirds  of  the  States,  and  that 
concurrence  of  a  majority  of  all  the  States  should  be  necessary 
to  a  choice.  Unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  to  lengthen  the 
term  and  to  have  all  the  electors  meet  at  one  place. 

The  most  important  part  of  the  question-  being  finally 
settled,  the  remaining  discussion  hinged  upon  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent  and  a  Council.  The  former  was  opposed  as  being  entirely 
unnecessary  and  merely  an  appendage  to  a  valuable  mode  of 
election  which  required  two  to  be  chosen  at  the  same  time,  in 
order  to  allow  the  small  States  sufficient  influence.  Mason 
thought  the  office  an  encroachment  on  the  rights  of  the  Senate, 
and  proposed,  as  a  substitute,  a  Council  chosen  by  the  Senate, 
of  six  members,  two  from  the  Eastern,  Middle  and  Southern 
sections  of  the  country  respectively.  They  were  to  rotate — two 
going  out  each  year.  He  protested  that,  in  rejecting  a  Council, 
1  Ibid,  V,  513.  2  Ibid,  V,  514.  3  Ibid. 


they  were  about  to  try  an  experiment  on  which  the  most  des- 
postic  government  had  never  ventured  :  "  Even  the  Grand 
Seignior  has  his  Divan."  His  motion  was  rejected,  although 
seconded  by  Franklin  and  approved  by  Madison,  Wilson,  Dick- 
inson and  others. 

The  whole  matter  being  referred  to  the  final  Committee,  the 
Article  as  placed  in  the  Constitution  resulted  : 

"  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America.  He  shall  hold  his  office  during  the 
term  of  four  years,  and  together  with  the  Vice-President,  chosen 
for  the  same  term,  be  elected  as  follows  :  Bach  State  shall  appoint, 
in  such  manner  as  the  Legislature  thereof  may  direct,  a  number 
of  electors,  equal  to  the  whole  number  of  senators  and  represen- 
tatives to  which  the  State  may  be  entitled  in  Congress  ;  but  no 
senator  or  representative  or  person  holding  any  office  of  trust  or 
profit  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  appointed  an  elector. 

"  The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  States  and  vote 
by  ballot  for  two  persons,  of  whom  one  at  least  shall  not  be  an 
inhabitant  of  the  same  State  with  themselves.  And  they  shall 
make  a  list  of  all  the  persons  voted  for,  and  of  the  number  of 
votes  for  each  ;  which  list  they  shall  sign  and  certify,  and  trans- 
mit sealed  to  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
directed  to  the  president  of  the  Senate.  The  president  of  the 
Senate  shall,  fti  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, open  all  the  certificates,  and  the  votes  shall  then  be 
counted.  The  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  shall 
be  the  President,  if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  electors  appointed  ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one 
wrho  have  such  a  majority  and  have  an  equal  number  of  votes, 
then  the  House  of  Representatives  shall  immediately  choose,  by 
ballot,  one  of  them  for  President ;  and  if  no  person  have  a  ma- 
jority, then,  from  the  five  highest  on  the  list,  the  said  House 
shall,  in  like  manner,  choose  the  President.  But,  in  choosing 
the  President  the  votes  shall  be  taken  by  States,  the  representa- 
tion from  each  State  having  one  vote  ;  a  quorum  for  this  purpose 
shall  consist  of  a  member  or  members  from  two-thirds  of  the 
States,  and  a  majority  of  all  the  States  shall  be  necessary  to  a 
choice.  In  every  case,  after  the  choice  of  the  President,  the 
the  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  of  the  electors 


20 

shall  be  the  Vice-President.  But  if  there  should  remain  two  or 
more  who  have  equal  votes,  the  Senate  shall  choose  from  them, 
by  ballot,  the  Vice-President." 

In  thus  reviewing  the  work  of  the  Federal  Convention  in 
regard  to  the  executive,  we  are  struck  with  the  fact  that  the 
method  finally  evolved  was  a  compromise  between  those  who 
wished  a  complete  independence  of  the  legistative  body  and 
those  who  desired  an  entire  dependence  upon  it.  In  the  second 
place  we  are  impressed  with  the  experimental  nature  of  the  plan. 
The  method  of  choosing  the  electors  was  thrown  back  upon  the 
States  from  sheer  inability  to  decide  upon  a  general  mode ;  the 
reference  to  different  branches  of  the  legislature  for  the  eventual 
election  of  President  and  Vice-President  had  no  precedent  and 
the  lack  of  a  designating  principle  was  the  result  of  a  happy 
thought  to  avoid  a  difficulty,  rather  than  the  logical  outcome  of 
any  principle.  There  is  also  a  striking  lack  of  any  conception 
of  the  inevitableness  of  party  influence  and  government,  which 
*  has  proved  the  most  basic  fact  of  our  national  life.  This  seems 
to  be  at  the  root  of  the  difficulty  in  deciding  upon  some  method 
of  election. 

Hamilton  said  in  the  Federalist  that  the  mode  of  choosing 
the  President  was  about  the  only  part  of  the  Constitution  which 
had  escaped  censure.  Compared  with  the  criticism  of  the  other 
parts  this  seems  true,  yet  there  were  objections  raised  to  this 
portion,  Gerry,  Randolph,  Mason  and  Luther  Martin,  each 
made  public  his  reasons  for  condemning  the  whole  plan,  and 
each  mentioned  some  provision  regarding  the  executive.  In  the 
Virginia  ratifying  Convention  Monroe1  objected  to  the  mode  of 
election  on  the  ground  that  it  gave  room  for  combination  and 
intrigue  among  the  electors  and  for  foreign  influence  in  the 
separate  States.  He  condemned  what  he  believed  to  be  the 
tendency  to  result  in  a  dependence  upon  the  State  governments 
rather  than  a  reference  to  the  people  at  large,  and  he  felt  that 
the  power  of  Congress  to  appoint  the  time  of  elections  would 
give  a  chance  for  undue  interference.  One  member  made  out 
an  elaborate  table  to  show  that  the  President  could  be  constitu- 
tionally elected  by  the  exceedingly  small  minority  of  17  voices 
1  Elliot,  III,  220,  488. 


21 

out  of  a  possible  I56.1  Mason  characterized  the  method  as  "an 
ignis  fatuus  on  the  American  people,-'  thrown  out  to  make  them 
believe  they  were  to  do  the  electing.2  He  suggested  that  the 
eligible  list  in  the  House  be  limited  to  two. 

In  the  North  Carolina  Convention  it  was  asserted  that  the 
power  of  Congress  to  determine  the  time  of  election  would  be 
used  by  that  body,  in  connection  with  its  power  over  the  army, 
to  control  the  election.  Richard  Henry  Lee,  who  was  an  invet- 
erate enemy  of  the  plan,  laid  himself  open  to  severe  criticism3 
by  misstating  it,  saying  that  it  gave  Virginia  only  one  vote.4 
Gerry,  in  a  pamphlet  entitled  "  Observations  by  a  Columbian 
Patriot,"5  said  that  limiting  the  vote  to  the  proposed  proportion 
was  almost  tantamount  to  an  exclusion  of  the  voice  of  the 
people,  and  wras  vesting  the  choice  solely  in  an  "  aristocratic 
junto,"  which  might  easily  combine  in  each  State  to  place  at 
the  head  of  the  Union  the  most  convenient  instrument  for 
despotism. 

In  answer  to  these  objections  the  advocates  of  the  proposed 
methods  repeated  the  arguments  given  in  the  Convention. 
Pamphlets  were  written  and  speeches  were  made  to  show  that 
there  was  absolutely  no  room  for  combination,  intrigue  or  cor- 
ruption among  the  electors.  John  Dickinson,  in  the  u  Letters 
of  Fabius  "  G  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  undue  influence 

1  Table  from  Elliot,  III,  492. 

Number  of  electors  =  number  of  senators  and  representatives  =  9*. 
Each  elector  has  2  votes  =  182. 

Let  4  candidates  get  45  votes  apiece  and  i  get  2  votes. 
The  election  will  be  thrown  into  the  House  and  5  candidates  voted  on. 
Vote  by. States  : 

N.  H.  has  3  representatives,  giving  a  majority  of  2  votes. 
.        R.I.      "     i  r      » 

Conn.    "5  "3      " 

N.J.      "     4  "  •'  ««  3      « 

Del.       "     i  i      » 

Ga.        "     3  "  «•  «•  2      " 

N.  C.    "     5  "  "  "  3      " 

Majority  of  7  States  =  15  votes. 
Minority  of  States  =  50  votes. 

Total  number  of  votes  =  91  electors  -f-  65  representatives  =  156. 
Total  number  of  votes  for  President  =  2  electors  -f-  15  representatives  =  17. 

2  Elliot,  III,  493.         »  Pennsylvania  Gazette,  January  2,  1788. 
*  Elliot,  I,  503. 

"  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution,"  1787-88,  P.  L.  Ford,  p.  12. 
6  Ibid,  pp.  171-172. 


22 

was  prevented  by  entrusting  the  election  to  no  standing  body,  a 
point  afterwards  emphasized  by  Hamilton.  Pinckney  repeated 
these  arguments  in  the  Legislature  of  South  Carolina.1  In  the 
North  Carolina  Convention  2  Iredell  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that 
"  in  all  human  probability  no  better  mode  of  election  could  have 
been  devised,  and  Davie  declared  it  impossible  for  human 
ingenuity  to  devise  any  mode  of  election  better  calculated  to 
exclude  undue  influence  and  combination.  Noah  Webster 3 
makes  a  similar  statement  in  one  of  his  pamphlets.  A  note, 
written  in  1801,  on  his  own  copy,  is  an  interesting  admission  : 
"  This  proves  how  little  dependence  can  be  placed  on  theory. 
Twelve  years'  experience,  or  four  elections,  demonstrates  the 
contrary." 

While  comparatively  little  criticism  was  made  of  the  mode 
of  election,  more  fault  was  found  with  the  re-eligibility  and 
powers  given  the  President.4  While  Wilson  was  trying  to 
prove,  in  the  Pennsylvania  Convention,5  that  he  would  not  be 
the  mere  tool  of  the  Senate,  as  was  alleged  by  the  opposition 
in  the  Convention  and  in  the  press,6  Patrick  Henry  was  crying, 
"  Away  with  your  President !  we  shall  have  a  King !  "  and 
"  strongly  and  pathetically  expatiating  on  the  probability  of  the 
President's  enslaving  America,  and  the  horrid  consequences  that 
must  result."7  The  objections,  especially  those  of  Mason,  to 
the  lack  of  a  Council  were  answered  by  "  A  Landholder,"  8  with 
the  statement  that  the  States  which  had  such  Councils  had 
found  them  useless,  and  complained  of  them  as  a  dead  weight. 

The  Vice-President  was  attacked  as  being  an  "  unnecessary 
if  not  a  dangerous  "  officer,9  who  gave  undue  prominence  to  his 
State  by  having  a  casting  vote  in  the  Senate,10  who  had  no  stated 
qualifications,11  who  simply  presided  in  the  Senate  for  want  of 
other  employment 12  and  who  might  be  elected  by  the  electors  of 
a  single  large  State,  since  a  majority  vote  was  not  requisite.13 
A  very  undesirable  person  might  thus  be  elevated  to  a  place 

1  Elliot.  IV,  304.          2  Ibid,  IV,  107. 

3  Ford's  "  Pamphlets,"  etc.,  pp.  35,  64-65.        4  Elliot,  I,  491,  493- 

5  McMaster  and  Stone  :  "  Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal  Constitution,"  p.  398. 

6  Ibid,  p.  586. 

1  Elliot,  III,  60.  8  Pennsylvania  Gazette,  Dec.  26,  1787. 

9  McMaster  and  Stone  :  "Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal  Constitution,"  p.  530. 

10  Elliot,  III,  486,  489.  u  Ford's  "  Pamphlets,"  etc.,  p.  310. 
J2  Elliot,  I,  495-                            13  Elliot,  I,  378. 


where  he  might  at  any  time,  by  the  death  or  disability  of  the 
President,  become  the  Chief  Magistrate.  Some  of  these  points 
were  well  taken,  but  little  attempt  seems  to  have  been  made  to 
answer  them  beyond  a  general  exposition  of  the  necessity  for  a 
settled  succession  l  and  an  explanation  that  his  casting  vote  in  the 
Senate  was  just,  since  otherwise  some  State  must  be  deprived  of 
its  full  representation  to  furnish  a  presiding  officer.  Davie,2 
who  was  a  member  of  the  Convention,  explained  that  one  of  the 
reasons  why  the  office  of  Vice-President  was  introduced  was  to 
prevent  a  deadlock  in  the  Senate  on  important  questions  by 
having  some  one  who  would  give  an  impartial  vote.  Though 
from  some  particular  State,  it  was  thought  that  the  nature  of  his 
office  would  render  the  Vice-President  impartial.  That  this  does 
not  appear  in  the  debates  is  doubtless  due  to  the  imperfect 
reports  we  possess. 

None  of  the  State  Conventions  proposed  any  Amendments 
relating  to  the  method  of  electing  the  executive  ;  three  proposed 
a  change  in  the  term. 


When  the  ratification  of  the  ninth  State  was  laid  before 
Congress,  a  committee  was  appointed  to  report  an  Act  for  putting 
the  new  Constitution  into  operation.3  After  much  delay,  occa- 
sioned by  the  difficulty  of  deciding  where  the  new  Congress 
should  meet,  it  was  resolved 4  that  the  first  Wednesday  in  March 
of  the  following  year  should  be  the  day  for  inaugurating  the 
new  government ;  New  York  was  to  be  the  temporary  seat.5 

Little  of  constitutional  import  in  regard  to  the  Chief 
Executive  can  be  gathered  from  the  first  two  elections,  because 
of  the  personality  of  Washington.  The  weakness  in  the  method 
is  to  be  seen  in  the  intrigues  centering  around  the  Vice. 
Presidency  at  every  election  until  the  designating  of  votes  was 
introduced  by  the  Twelfth  Amendment.  From  the  beginning 
it  was  understood  that  Washington  would  be  called  to  fill  the 
office  of  President.  It  was  hinted  at  in  the  Convention,0  the 
newspapers  spoke  of  it  as  a  matter  of  course,7  and  no  other  name 

1  "  Ford's  Pamphlets,"  etc.,  p.  349.  '2  Elliot,  IV,  42. 

3  Journals  of  Congress,  XIII,  36.     July  2,  1788.  4  Ibid,  XIII,  105. 

5  Ibid,  XIII,  36,  48,  57,  60-69,  73-75,  88,  95,  96,  99,  102-105. 

6  Elliot,  V.  154. 

1  Pennsylvania  Gazette,  Sept.  26,  1787,  March  5,  1788,  July  2,  1788. 


24 

was  seriously  considered,  although  Franklin,  Patrick  Henry, 
Samuel  Adams  and  John  Hancock  were  suggested.  To  gain  his 
support  for  ratification  in  the  Massachusetts  Convention,  Han- 
cock was  told  that  u  if  Virginia  did  not  unite,  which  was  prob- 
lematical, he  would  be  considered  as  the  only  fair  candidate  for 
President,"  l  but  he  seems  to  have  been  the  only  one  to  take  his 
candidacy  seriously.2  By  the  same  medium  of  the  press  and  of 
private  correspondence  a  Vice-President  was  called  for  to  repre- 
sent the  other  section  of  the  country,  and  general  sentiment 
centered  on  John  Adams  as  the  most  fitting  person. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  provision  of  the  Constitution 
which  implied  an  equality  of  claims  on  the  part  of  the  two 
candidates  should  be  entirely  disregarded,  and  at  no  election 
previous  to  the  passage  of  the  Twelfth  Amendment  were  two 
men  voted  for  as  equals.  A  person  unacquainted  with  the  con- 
stitutional provision  would  be  unable  to  infer  it  from  the  ac- 
counts of  the  electoral  votes.  An  elector  from  Maryland 3 
writes :  "  We  all  gave  our  votes  for  General  Washington  as 
President  and  Colonel  Harrison,  our  Chief  Justice,  Vice- 
President."  A  letter  from  Virginia  4  says  that  ten  of  the  twelve 
electors  of  that  State  had  "  chosen  unanimously  George  Wash- 
ington, President.  For  Vice-President  the  honorable  John 
Adams  had  five  votes,  Governor  Clinton  three  votes,  the  honor- 
able Mr.  Hancock,  one  vote  and  the  honorable  Mr.  Jay  one 
vote."  A  letter  from  Boston  5  speaks  of  the  ballots  of  the  elec- 
tors being  u  unanimously  in  favor  of  his  Excellency  General 
Washington  for  President,  and  Mr.  Adams,  Vice-President."  Of 
course  these  were  misstatements,  as  far  as  the  letter  of  the  Con- 
stitution was  concerned,  for  what  each  elector  really  did  was  to 
write  down  the  names  of  two  men,  not  designating  which  he 
meant  for  President.  These  examples,  selected  from  many,  are 
enough  to  show  how  far  the  popular  ideas  were  from  conforming 
to  the  constitutional  provision.  This  divergence  became  con- 
stantly greater  as  parties  became  better  organized. 

As  soon  as  it  was  clearly  understood  who  was  to  be  the 
Vice-Presidential  candidate,  intriguing  began.  The  element  of 

1  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King  (Putnam  Ed.,  1895),  I,  319. 

2  Ibid,  I,  343. 

3  Pennsylvania  Packet,  Feb.  12,  1789.  *  Ibid,  Feb.  14,  1789. 
5  Ibid,  Feb.  16,  1789. 


25 

uncertainty  involved  in  the  clause  of  the  Constitution  which 
prevented  the  electors  from  specifying  their  choice  for  the  two 
offices  respectively  was  used  with  effect.  In  the  first  election  it 
was  employed  by  Hamilton  to  prevent  the  elevation  to  the 
Presidency  of  a  man  not  intended  by  the  people  for  that  office. 
In  succeeding  elections  it  was  utilized  by  him  to  raise  to  that 
station  a  person  not  designed  for-  it  by  his  party.  The  manipu- 
lation of  this  uncertain  element,  by  which  a  man  might  be 
brought  into  the  executive  office  by  clever  wirepulling,  irre- 
spective of  the  popular  desire,  forms  the  keynote  of  the  history 
of  the  first  four  elections,  and  gives  the  struggle  centering 
around  the  Vice-Presidency,  especially  in  1796  and  1800,  a 
greater  significance  than  is  usually  attached  to  it.  Had  it  not 
been  for  the  attempts  of  the  Federalists  to  elect  Burr  as  Presi- 
dent in  1801,  the  Constitution  might  have  undergone  amend- 
ment, not  by  enactment,  but  by  the  slower  process  of  public 
opinion.  Before  the  electors  assembled  in  their  respective 
States  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  February,  1789,  Hamilton  had 
busied  himself  seeing  to  it  that  no  one  should  receive  as  many 
or  more  votes  than  Washington,  and  the  popular  will  thereby 
defeated.  This  was  the  ostensible  object  of  his  advice  to  the 
electors  of  several  States.  The  influence  he  probably  had  is 
shown  by  a  letter  from  Trumbull  to  Adams,  in  which  he  says 
an  express  from  Hamilton  caused  the  Connecticut  electors  to 
throw  away  two  votes  "  when  they  were  sure  they  would  do  no 
harm."  The  result  of  this  interference,  combined  with  the 
desire  of  the  States  to  honor  their  u  favorite  sons  "  with  a  com- 
plimentary vote,  brought  down  the  number  cast  for  Adams  to 
one  less  than  a  majority ;  but,  as  the  Constitution  did  not 
require  a  majority  vote  for  Vice-President,  he  was  declared 
elected.  That  the  electors  divided  their  second  votes  among 
eleven  men  is  significant ;  in  the  first  place,  of  the  light  in  which 
the  office  of  Vice-President  was  regarded,  and,  in  the  second,  of 
the  lack  of  party  organization.  The  change  in  both  respects 
becomes  marked  in  the  succeeding  elections. 

During  Washington's  first  administration,  Congress  passed 

an  electoral  law  regulating  the  time  and  manner  of  voting,  and 

the  succession  in  case  of  death,  resignation  or  disability  of  both 

President    and    Vice-President.       A    committee,    consisting   of 

1  Works  of  John  Adams  (1851),  VIII,  484. 


26 

Rutherford,  Sherman  and  Burr,  was  appointed  in  the  Senate1  to 
draft  a  bill  for  this  purpose.  It  passed  the  Senate  and  was  sent 
to  the  House.  That  body  proposed  certain  amendments,  all  of 
which  were  agreed  to  except  the  suggestion  that  the  Secretary 
of  State,  instead  of  the  President  pro  tempore  of  the  Senate, 
be  the  eventual  successor.  The  House  finally  receded  from  this 
and  on  February  21,  1792,  passed  the  bill.  The  most  import- 
ant section,  in  view  of  the  events  of  the  election  of  1801,  was 
that  which  provided  that,  in  case  of  removal,  death,  resignation 
or  disability  of  both  the  President  and  Vice-President,  the 
President  pro  tern,  of  the  Senate  should  act  as  President  until 
the  disability  should  be  removed  or  a  new  President  elected. 
In  case  there  was  no  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Speaker  of 
the  House  for  the  time  being  should  act. 

In  the  election  of  1792  the  Presidency  was  not  brought 
into  question,  since  Washington  consented  to  accept  it  for  a 
second  time.  The  Vice-Presidency  was  the  more  important, 
however,  as  its  incumbent  was  the  "  heir  apparent."  The  two 
persons  who  offered  themselves  to  the  consideration  of  the 
Republicans  were  Aaron  Burr  and  George  Clinton.  The  merits 
and  demerits  of  both  were  discussed  by  the  leaders  of  the  party. 
Monroe2  considered  Burr  impossible,  while  Jefferson3  deprecated 
the  effect  upon  Republicanism  which  would  follow  the  support 
of  a  man  who  had  virtually  stolen  the  Governorship  of  his 
State,  as  Clinton  had  just  done.  His  conclusion  is  significant 
in  its  bearing  upon  the  political  situation:  "And  for  what  [is 
he  to  be  supported]?  to  draw  over  the  Anti-Federalists,  who 
are  not  numerous  enough  to  be  worth  drawing  over."  Never- 
theless, the  party  decided  to  give  him  its  support. 

Hamilton  thought  that  the  appearance  of  Burr  was  either  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  Clinton4  or  else  a  plan  to  divide  the  North- 
ern vote  and  so  let  in  Jefferson  by  the  votes  of  the  South.5  His 
recent  conflicts  with  Jefferson  caused  him  to  consider  him  "  a 
man  of  sublimated  and  paradoxical  imagination,  cherishing 
notions  incompatible  with  regular  and  firm  government ;" <;  and 

1  Annals  of  Congress.     Second  Congress,  1791-1793.    Pp.  25,  30.  36. 
-  Writings  of  Monroe  (Putnam  Ed.),  I,  242-244.    June  10,  1792. 

3  Writings  of  Jefferson  (Putnam  Ed.),  VI,  90.     June  21,  1792. 

4  Works,  V,  528.     Sept.  23,  1792. 

5  Ibid,  V,  533.     Oct.  10,  1792.     V,  537.     Oct.  22,  1792. 

6  Ibid,  V,  535.     Oct.  15,  1792. 


27 

he,  therefore,  determined  for  once  to  support  Adams.  There 
were  hints  that  u  the  degradation  of  Mr.  Adams  "  would  not  be 
unfavorably  received  in  certain  quarters  ;x  but,  when  the  election 
occurred,  the  entire  Federal  vote  went  for  Adams,  and  all  but 
five  of  the  Republican  votes  were  given  to  Clinton.  Those  five2 
seem  to  have  partaken  of  the  complimentary  nature  of  the 
scattering  votes  of  1789. 

Before  the  election  of  1796,  the  first  real  Presidential 
contest,  Hamilton  had  determined  upon  his  course,  which  in  no 
way  contemplated  the  succession  of  Adams  to  the  office  of  chief 
magistrate.  The  Republicans  seem  to  have  felt  from  the 
beginning  that  Jefferson  was  the  only  one  whom  they  could 
push  writh  success  ;3  and  Burr,  having  taken  the  leadership  of  the 
New  York  Republicans  from  Clinton,  was  named  by  the  caucus 
of  I7964  as  the  candidate  for  Vice-President.  Among  the  mass 
of  the  Federalists,  it  was  taken  for  granted  that  Adams  would 
be  the  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  the  only  question  being  to 
get  some  one  for  the  second  place  who  would  cause  a  diversion 
of  Southern  blows.  But  the  leaders  of  the  party  had  other 
plans.  Jay's  prospects  having  been  entirely  obscured  by  the 
Treaty,  early  in  1796  Hamilton  requested  Marshall  to  make 
overtures  to  Patrick  Henry  to  permit  his  name  to  be  used  at  the 
next  canvass  for  the  Presidency.  Marshall  returned  his  answer 
through  King,5  who  wrote  Hamilton  that  Henry  probably  would 
not  agree  to  the  arrangement,  but  that  Gen.  Thomas  Pinckney 
was  about  to  return  home  ;  to  his  former  stock  of  popularity  he 
would  add  the  good  will  of  those  gratified  by  the  Spanish  treaty, 
and  he  would,  if  concurred  in,  receive  as  great  or  greater  South- 
ern and  Western  support  than  any  other  man.  This  suggestion 
pleased  Hamilton6  even  better  than  his  own.  It  must  be  noted 
that  these  suggestions  are  for  a  Presidential  candidate.  That 
the  Congressional  caucus,  held  some  time  in  the  summer  of 
17967  nominated  Adams  for  the  Presidency  and  Pinckney  for 

1  Life,  etc.,  of  Rufus  King,  I,  430.     Sept.  30,  1792.     2  Jefferson,  4  ;  Burr.  i. 

3  Works  of  John  Adams,  VI,  544.     Madison's  Works,  II,  83. 

4  Gibbs'  Memoirs,    II,   488.     "An   Examination   of  the  Various  Charges 
against  Aaron  Burr,  and  a  Development  of  the  Character  and  Views  of  His 
Political  Opponents."     Phila.,  1803.     By  Aristides  (Wm.  Van  Ness). 

5  Life,  etc.,  of  Rufus  King,  II,  46.     May  2,  1796. 

6  Hamilton's  Works,  1851,  VI,  114.      May  4,  1796. 
1  Gibbs'  Memoirs,  II,  488, 


28 

the  Vice-Presidency  did  not  interrupt  the  plan  to  make  use  of  the 
lack  of  a  designating  principle  in  the  Constitution  to  bring 
Pinckney  into  the  first  office. 

In  June,  King  went  to  England  as  Minister,  and  in  the 
frank  and  rather  gossipy  letters  written  him  by  Troup  and  other 
friends  we  get  a  glimpse  of  the  way  matters  were  progressing. 
November  i6th,  Troup  wrote  him1  that  in  New  York  the  electors 
were  all  good  men,  who  would  vote  unanimously  for  Adams  and 
Pinckney.  "  I  am  inclined  to  think,"  he  added,  il  and  such  is 
the  inclination  of  our  friends  here,  that  Mr.  Adams  will  not 
succeed  ;  but  we  have  Mr.  Pinckney  completely  in  our  power  if 
our  Eastern  friends  do  not  refuse  him  some  of  their  votes  under 
the  idea  that  if  they  vote  for  him  unanimously  they  may  injure 
Mr.  Adams.  Upon  this  subject  we  are  writing  to  all  our  East- 
ern friends  and  endeavoring  to  make  them  accord  with  us  in 
voting  unanimously  for  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Pinckney."  Another 
friend  wrote  to  King  from  Philadelphia,2  on  Nov.  29th  that  the 
election  of  electors  were  so  far  closed  as  to  determine  with  con. 
siderable  accuracy  the  result.  The  friends  of  Adams  calculated 
on  a  majority  in  his  favor,  but  so  small  that  it  would  be  risking 
too  much  to  trust  entirely  to  it.  He  concluded,  "  It  is  therefore 
deemed  expedient  to  recommend  to  the  Federal  electors  to  give  a 
uniform  vote  for  Mr.  Pinckney,  which,  with  those  that  he  will 
obtain  to  the  Southward,  detached  from  Mr.  Adams,  will  give 
him  a  decided  majority  over  the  other  candidates."  Later  Hig- 
ginson  3  wrote  to  Hamilton  from  Boston  :  "  Your  letter  of  28th 
of  last  month  4  I  received,  and  communicated  its  contents  to 
some  of  our  electors  ;  a  majority  of  them  were  at  first  inclined 
to  throw  away  their  votes  from  Mr.  Pinckney,  lest  he  should  rise 
above  Mr.  Adams,  but  your  information  as  to  Vermont,  with 
some  observations  made  to  them,  showing  the  danger  of  so 
doing,  decided  all  but  three,  who  were  determined,  upon  inter- 
ested and  personal  motives  to  waste  theirs.  Several  hours  were 
spent  in  discussion  before  they  voted  ;  the  result  was — 16  for 
Adams,  13  for  Pinckney,  2  for  Governor  Johnston  and  i  for  Mr. 
Ellsworth."  He  further  gave  his  opinion  that,  by  the  Southern 
votes,  Pinckney  would  probably  come  in  first,  in  which  case  he 

1  Life,  etc.,  of  Rufus  King,  II,  no.     Nov.  16,  1796. 

2  Ibid,  II,  112.  3  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  185-186.     Dec.  9,  1796. 
*  Not  found  in  Hamilton's  Works. 


29 

suggested  that  Hamilton,  Governor  Jay  and  the  President  should 
arrange  some  plan  to  conciliate  and  appease  Adams  or  "  serious 
inconveniences  "  might  result.  The  result  of  this  solicitude  for 
Federal  success  at  the  expense  of  Adams  was  the  defeat  of 
Pinckney,  since  the  New  England  electors,  in  a  fright,  threw 
away  as  many  as  eighteen  votes,  while  the  only  Southern  State 
which  gave  Pinckney  votes  but  withheld  them  from  Adams  was 
South  Carolina. 

While  the  exact  vote  was  still  uncertain  Jefferson  wrote 
Madison1  that  a  tie  between  himself  and  Adams  seemed  possible, 
since  it  was  not  likely  that  the  Eastern  States  would  suffer  them- 
selves to  be  made  tools  for  bringing  in  Pinckney  over  Adams. 
He  also  thought  of  the  possibility  of  no  majority  among  the 
representatives,  in  case  the  election  went  to  the  House,  a  diffi- 
culty for  which  the  Constitution  provided  no  remedy  and  one 
which  finally  occurred  in  1801.  He  requested2  Madison  to  declare 
on  every  occasion,  if  a  contest  arose,  that  his  desire  was  for  Adams 
to  be  preferred  "  to  prevent  the  phenomenon  of  a  pseudo-president 
at  so  early  a  date."  Fortunately  no  such  contest  arose,  and  Adams 
became  President  with  three  votes  more  than  Jefferson  received. 
A  fact  which  had  an  important  bearing  on  the  next  election  was 
the  defection  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  from  Burr,  giving 
him  only  seven  votes  out  of  a  possible  thirty-one. 

Soon  after  his  inauguration  Adams  wrote  a  letter,  which  is 
so  characteristic  that  it  deserves  to  be  quoted  :3  "  It  is  a  delicate 

thing  for  me  to  speak  of  the  late  election Had  Mr.  Jay 

or  some  others  been  in  question,  it  might  have  less  mortified  my 
vanity,  and  infinitely  less  alarmed  my  apprehension  for  the  public. 
But  to  see  such  a  character  as  Jefferson,  and  much  more  such  an 
unknown  being  as  Pinckney,  brought  over  my  head,  and  tramp- 
ling on  the  bellies  of  hundreds  of  other  men  infinitely  his  superiors 
in  talents,  services  and  reputation,  filled  me  with  apprehensions 
for  the  safety  of  us  all.  It  demonstrated  to  me  that,  if  the  pro- 
ject succeeded,  our  Constitution  could  not  have  lasted  four  years. 

That  must  be  a  sordid  people,  indeed,  a  people  destitute 

of  a  sense  of  honor,  equity  and  character,  that  could  submit  to  be 
governed  and  see  hundreds  of  its  most  meritorious  public  men 

1  Jefferson's  Works  (Putnam  Ed.),  VII,  91.     Dec.  17,  1796. 

2  Ibid,  VII,  105. 


Works  of  John  Adams,  VIII,  535  ;  March  30,  1797,  To  Knox. 


30 

governed  by  a  Pinckney  under  an  elective  government  ....  I 
mean  by  this  no  disrespect  to  Mr.  Pinckney.  I  believe  him  to  be 
a  worthy  man.  I  speak  only  by  comparison  with  others." 

By  the  fall  of  1799  the  measures  of  Adams'  administration, 
especially  the  French  Mission,  had  so  exasperated  the  Hamilton 
wing  of  the  Federalist  party  that  they  were  determined  to  get 
rid  of  him,  unless  pushed  to  his  support  by  extreme  necessity.1 
Again  they  cast  about  for  a  presidential  candidate  of  sufficient 
strength  to  supplant  him,  and  Gouverneur  Morris  wrote  to  Wash- 
ington 2  on  December  9th,  setting  forth  the  dissatisfaction  with 
Adams  and  urging  him  to  come  forward  for  a  third  term.  As 
Washington  died  on  December  I4th,  it  is  probable  that  he  never 
saw  this  letter.  They  discussed  Chief  Justice  Ellsworth  and 
C.  C.  Pinckney,3  but  in  May,  1800,  the  result  of  the  New  York 
elections  showed  that  division  meant  defeat. 

In  the  balanced  state  of  parties  it  had  been  seen  that 
Republican  success  in  the  New  York  State  elections  probably 
meant  national  success,4  that  defeat  there  was  certain  ruin  of 
national  hopes.  In  this  crisis  Burr's  political  sagacity  and 
adroitness  were  given  full  play,  and  to  him  the  victory  was 
ascribed  by  both  friend  and  foe.5  By  making  up  a  ticket  for 
the  Assembly  of  such  men  as  Clinton,  Gates  and  Brockholst 
Livingston  the  Republicans  carried  the  day  against  the  Federal 
ticket,  made  up  of  comparatively  unknown  men,  selected  mainly 
for  their  pliancy.6  The  New  York  elections  were  settled  on  May 
2d.  On  May  yth  Hamilton  wrote  to  Governor  Jay  suggesting 
an  extra  session  of  the  Legislature  to  change  the  electoral  law, 
and  so  deprive  the  Republicans  of  the  fruits  of  the  victory  just 
gained  at  the  polls.  His  father-in-law,  General  Schuyler,  wrote 
a  similar  letter,  on  the  same  day,  saying  that  the  plan  was  sug- 
gested by  leading  Federalists,  Marshall  among  the  number,  but 
Jay  refused  to  consider  the  suggestion.  On  May  loth  Hamilton 
wrote  7  that  he  would  never  again  be  responsible  for  Adams  by 

1  Life,  etc.,  of  King,  III,  142.     Nov.  6,  1799.     Ill,  173.     Jan.  5,  1799. 

2  Sparks  :  "Life  and  Writings  of  Gouverneur  Morris,"  III,  123. 

3  Life,  etc.,  of  King,  III,  209. 

*  Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  432-434.     March  4,  1800. 

5  Adams  :  "Life  of  Gallatin,"  pp.  232-240.     Adams'  Works,  X,  125. 

6  Parton  :  "Life  of  Aaron  Burr,"  I,  246-252. 

7  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  441.     To  Sedgwick. 


his  direct  support,  even  though  the  consequence  should  be  the 
election  of  Jefferson,  adding  that  the  only  way  to  prevent  a 
fatal  schism  in  the  Federal  party  was  to  support  Pinckney  in 
good  earnest.  The  next  day  Sedgwick,  Speaker  of  the  House, 
wrote  to  King *  that  there  had  been  a  meeting  of  the  whole 
Federal  party  in  Congress,  and  that  they  had  agreed  to  support, 
bona  fide,  Adams  and  C.  C.  Pinckney,  that  is,  to  give  an  equal 
vote  to  each  as  the  only  way  to  "escape  the  fangs  of  Jefferson." 
Gore  also  wrote  to  King  that  it  was  possible  they  might  be  so 
alarmed  at  the  elections  in  New  York  as  to  be  true  to  the  agree- 
ment, but  he  doubted  it.  In  the  meantime  Hamilton  was  de- 
nouncing Adams  2  and  urging  that  equal  votes  be  obtained  for 
both  candidates  in  New  England,  so  that  by  extra  Southern 
votes  Pinckney  might  come  in  first.  He  consulted  various  per- 
sons concerning  the  advisability  of  a  private  publication  against 
Adams,  and  on  October  2 ad  the  famous  "  Letter  Concerning 
the  Public  Conduct  and  Character  of  John  Adams,  Esq.,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States "  was  printed,  It  was  a  vehement 
personal  as  well  as  political  arraignment  of  Adams,  and  its 
boomerang  nature  was  seen  when  Burr,  immediately  obtaining 
possession  of  it,  made  parts  of  it  public,  thus  compelling  the 
publication  of  the  whole. 

In  the  Republican  party  the  leadership  and  first  place  were 
conceded  without  question  to  Jefferson,  and  it  remained  only  to 
decide  upon  the  person  to  be  voted  for  as  Vice-President.  Gal- 
latin  was  at  this  time  the  leader  of  the  Republicans  in  Congress, 
and  as  a  Congressional  caucus  would  nominate,  Matthew  L. 
Davis,  Burr's  closest  friend,  kept  Gallatin  informed  of  Burr's 
part  in  the  political  affairs  in  New  York,  ending  a  series  of 
letters  with  a  direct  query  as  to  the  Vice-Presidential  candidates.3 
He  discussed  the  merits  of  the  three  possible  candidates,  Clin- 
ton, Livingston  and  Burr,  and  urged  that  the  last  named  be  re- 
warded for  his  services.  Gallatin  endeavored  to  find  out  the 
wishes  of  the  New  York  Republicans  through  his  father-in-law, 
Commodore  Nicholson,  prominent  in  New  York  politics.  He 
was  informed  that  Livingston  was  undesirable,  that  Clinton  de- 
clined to  run  and  that  unbounded  confidence  was  reposed  in 

1  Life,  etc.,  of  King,  III,  238.     May  u,  1800. 

2  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  483. 

3  Adams'  "Life  of  Gallatin",  pp.  232-240. 


32 

Burr,  who  was  considered  the  only  suitable  person.1  Upon 
receipt  of  this  information  a  caucus  was  held,  May  nth,  Galla- 
tin  reported,  and  it  was  unanimously  agreed  to  support  Burr  for 
Vice-President.2  Burr,  however,  had  held  in  mind  the  Repub- 
lican votes  which  he  did  not  get  in  1796,  aiid  he  recalled  the 
fact  to  those  who  approached  him  in  regard  to  his  candidacy. 
There  is  no  proof  that  he  was  given  pledges  for  an  equal  vote 
with  Jefferson,  as  was  stated  afterwards,3  but  it  is  certain  that  he 
took  care  to  impress  the  matter  upon  the  Southern  leaders,4  and 
there  are  indications  that  a  tie  was  contemplated  by  him.  So 
close  was  the  contest  sure  to  be  that  in  November,  1799,  Sedg- 
wick  had  found  consolation  5  in  the  fact  that  a  "good  decision  " 
would  be  made  by  the  House  in  case  the  u  Jacobins  should  be 
unable  to  procure  for  their  candidate  for  the  presidency  a 
majority."  The  tie  contemplated  by  him,  however,  was  prob- 
ably one  between  the  rival  leaders  rather  than  between  the  two 
Republican  candidates. 

The  developments  of  a  year  caused  Madison  to  anticipate 
the  tie  which  occurred,  and  the  suspicions  that  the  Republicans 
entertained  of  Burr  may  be  seen  in  Madison's  denial  of  them. 
November  10,  1800,  he  wrote  to  Monroe"  that  he  could  not 
apprehend  any  danger  of  a  surprise  that  would  throw  Jefferson 
out  of  the  first  place,  nor  did  he  believe  that  a  single  Republican 
vote  would  abandon  him.  He  thought  that  the  worst  that 
could  possibly  happen  would  be  a  tie  between  Jefferson  and 
Burr,  which  would,  of  course,  be  satisfactorily  arranged  in  the 
House.  As  time  went  on  the  likelihood  of  a  tie  became  greater, 
and  when  the  South  Carolina  vote  became  known,  Jefferson  7 
wrote  to  Burr  that  it  was  badly  managed  not  to  have  arranged 
with  certainty  what  seemed  to  have  been  left  to  hazard,  that  is, 
that  some  one  elector  should  have  been  instructed  to  throw 
away  his  vote  to  prevent  a  tie,  as  was  done  in  the  Federal  party. 
It  seems  that  Burr's  friend,  Gelston,  had  assured  Madison  8  that 
such  an  arrangement  had  been  made  in  two  or  three  States. 
Whether  he  was  preventing  any  further  move  on  the  part  of 

1  Ibid,  p.  242.     May  7,  1800.        2  Ibid,  p.  243.     May  12,  1800. 
3  Gibbs'  Memoirs,  II,  488.         4  Madison's  Works,  II,  160,  162. 
5  Life,  etc.,  of  King,  III,  146,  155.        6  Madison's  Works,  II,  163. 

7  Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  467.     Dec.  15,  1800. 

8  Madison's  Works,  II,  166.     Dec.  20,  1800. 


33 

Madison  or  really  thought  he  was  telling  the  truth,  cannot  be 
determined.  When  the  full  vote  became  known,  it  was  found 
that  no  Republican  elector  had  failed  to  vote  for  both  candi- 
dates, and  therefore  that  the  election  would  devolve  upon  the 
House  of  Representatives.  It  was  part  of  the  gossip  of  the  day 
that  the  South  Carolina  vote  had  been  diverted  from  Pinckney 
to  Burr  by  young  Mr.  Alston,  afterwards  Governor  of  the  State, 
whom  Burr  rewarded  for  his  services  with  the  hand  of  his 
daughter  Theodosia.  l 

When  it  became  evident  that  the  House  would  have  to 
make  the  final  choice,  the  Federalists,  who  were  in  the  majority 
in  that  body,  began  to  indulge  in  the  wildest  schemes  to  prevent 
an  election  and  then  to  pass  a  new  law  giving  the  Presidency 
to  the  Chief  Justice  ;  to  let  the  office  devolve  upon  the  President 
pro  tern  of  the  Senate  or  to  elect  Burr  instead  of  Jefferson. 
Hillhouse  was  said  to  have  drafted  a  bill  embodying  the  first 
mentioned  plan,2  but  it  was  not  brought  forward.  Gouverneur 
Morris  and  the  other  more  farsighted  Federalists  advised  against 
it,3  and  it  was  foreseen  that  no  one  would  be  willing  to  assume 
the  responsibility  of  such  a  usurpation.  The  result  was  that 
the  last-named  scheme  was  decided  upon,  and  the  Federalist 
Representatives  united  in  the  attempt  to  give  Burr  the  first 
place,  thus  making  use  of  the  lack  of  a  designating  principle  in 
the  Constitution  to  do  for  their  opponents  what  Hamilton  had 
been  trying  to  do  for  them.  This  policy  was  not  definitely  de- 
cided upon  until  the  Republicans  had  become  very  much  agi- 
tated over  the  prospect  of  having  both  Jefferson  and  Burr  set 
aside.  As  soon  as  Hamilton  heard  of  their  intentions  he  wrote 
to  Wolcott,  deprecating  the  scheme  :  u  There  is  no  doubt  but 
that,  upon  every  virtuous  and  prudent  calculation,  Jefferson  is 
to  be  preferred.  He  is  by  far  not  so  dangerous  a  man,  and  he 
has  pretensions  to  character.  As  to  Burr,  there  is  nothing  in 

his  favor He  is  truly  the  Cataline  of  America." 

In  view  of  the  credit  usually  given  to  Hamilton  for  the  defeat 
of  this  attempt  jof  the  Federalists,  it  is  interesting  to  see  that 
his  letters 4  plead  reasons  of  Federal  expediency  and  the  per- 

"  Life  of  Gallatin,"  pp.  244-245.     Life,  etc.,  of  King,  III,  459. 

2  Aurora.     March  16,  1801. 

3  Life,  etc.,  of  Gouverneur  Morris,  III,  132-133.     Dec.  19,  1800. 

4  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  419,  495,  497,  499,  500,  502,  517,  520,  521. 


34 

sonal  uufitness  of  Burr  rather  than  the  political  dishonesty  of 
bringing  in  as  President  a  man  whom  no  one  had  wished  or  in- 
tended for  that  place.  It  is  doubtful  if  he  ever  saw  it  in  that 
light,  so  much  had  his  own  efforts  been  directed  towards  a 
similar  result. 

The  day  appointed  for  counting  the  electoral  vote  was 
February  n,  1801,  and  as  the  Federalists  openly  discussed  their 
intentions  it  behooved  the  Republicans  to  decide  upon  a  plan  of 
action  adequate  to  the  emergency.  They  declared  that  should 
Burr  be  elected  they  would  acquiesce,  though  not  cheerfully, 
since  that  would  be  within  the  letter  of  the  Constitution,1  but 
that  they  would  not  submit  to  a  law  to  name  a  President.  Cal- 
culations were  made  to  show  that  should  the  Federalists  pass  a 
law  for  a  new  election  they  might  gain  the  helm  again,2  since 
in  the  five  New  England  States,  New  Jersey  and  Delaware,  both 
branches  of  the  Legislature  were  Federal,  in  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland  and  South  Carolina,  the  Senates  were 
Federal,  and  those  four  States  would  refuse  to  act ;  therefore  the 
49  votes  of  the  New  England  States,  New  Jersey  and  Delaware 
would  outweigh  the  44  votes  of  the  Southern  States  which  were 
Republican.  Such  discussions  called  forth  the  letter  from 
Madison  to  Jefferson,  which  has  been  denounced  as  a  u  bitter 
comment  on  his  political  honesty,"  and  a  shameful  recantation 
of  his  principles.3  He  wrote :  "  On  the  supposition  of  either 
event,  whether  of  an  interregnum  in  the  Executive,  or  of  a  sur- 
reptitious intrusion  into  it,  it  becomes  a  question  of  the  first 
order,  what  is  the  course  demanded  by  the  crisis?  Will  it  be 
best  to  acquiesce  in  a  suspension  or  usurpation  of  the  Executive 
aiithority  till  the  meeting  of  Congress  in  December  next,  or  for 
Congress  to  be  summoned  by  a  joint  proclamation  or  recom- 
mendation of  the  two  characters  having  a  majority  of  votes  for 
President?  My  present  judgment  favors  the  latter  expedient. 
The  prerogative  of  convening  the  Legislature  must  reside  in  one 
or  other  of  them,  and  if  both  concur,  must  substantially  include 
the  requisite  will.  The  intentions  of  the  people  must  un- 

1  Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  469.     Dec.  18,  1800.         Aurora.    Feb.  9,  1801. 
Open  letter  to  John  Marshall. 

2  "  Life  of  Gallatin,"  p.  255. 

3  McMaster  :     "  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,"  II,  516-517. 
J.  C.  Hamilton  :   "  History  of  the  Republic,"  VII,  431-432.    Von  Hoist  :  "  Con- 
stitutional History  of  the  United  States,"  I,  171. 


35 

doubtedly  be  pursued  and  if,  in  reference  to  the  Constitution,  the 
proceeding  be  not  strictly  regular,  the  irregularity  will  be  less  in 
form  than  any  other  adequate  to  the  emergency,  and  will  lie  in 
form  only,  rather  than  in  substance  ;  whereas  the  other  remedies 
proposed  are  substantial  violations  of  the  will  of  the  people,  of 
the  scope  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  public  order  and 
interest." 

Not  even  the  Federalists  denied  that  it  would  be  a 
"  stretcli  "  if  not  an  open  violation  of  the  Constitution  to  hand 
over  the  Presidency  to  the  President  pro  tern,  of  the  Senate  or 
to  a  person  specially  designated  by  law,  when  there  were  per- 
sons, constitutionally  elected,  to  be  chosen  from.  Nor  did  either 
party  fail  to  see  that  the  success  of  such  an  effort  would  en- 
danger the  republic.  Such  a  contingency  had  never  been  con- 
templated by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  and  any  measure 
whatever  that  might  be  taken  to  meet  it  must  necessarily  be 
outside  the  provisions  of  that  document.  It  seems  hardly  just, 
therefore,  to  accuse  Madison,  although  he  was  a  strict  construc- 
tionist,  of  being  politically  dishonest  in  his  attempt  to  meet  by 
an  extra-constitutional  measure  a  violation  of  the  Constitution 
so  unexpected  that  no  remedy  had  been  provided,  in  State  or  in 
Nation,  and  to  acquiesce  in  which  might  mean  a  virtual  disso- 
lution of  the  Union. 

Madison  asked  further  in  his  letter  if  it  were  possible  that 
Adams  would  sign  such  a  law  as  the  Federalists  were  discuss- 
ing. Jefferson  so  far  deserted  his  attitude  of  a  spectator  as  to 
approach  Adams  on  the  subject,1  but  found  him  intractable,  as 
usual.  Adams  soon  after  wrote  2  to  Gerry  that  he  saw  no  more 
danger  of  a  political  convulsion  if  Congress  should  make  a 
President  than  if  Jefferson  or  Burr  should  be  declared  such.  He 
thought  "  the  people  would  be  as  well  satisfied  "  in  one  case  as 
in  the  other.  Marshall  was  said  to  have  expressed  a  similiar 
opinion.3  . 

The  Republicans  were  meeting  all  over  the  country  and 
expressing  their  opinion  in  quite  a  different  vien.  In  Philadel- 
phia they  formally  asserted  4  that  in  the  original  nominations 

1  Writings  of  Jefferson.     Anas,  I,  313. 

2  Works  of  John  Adams,  IX,  98,  Feb.  7,  1801. 

3  Writings  of  Monroe,  III,  256,  Jan.  18,  1801.     Aurora,  Feb.  9,  1801. 

4  Aurora,  Jan.  12,  1801. 


36 

Jefferson  was  designed  for  the  Presidency,  and  in  some  places  it 
was  declared  that  legislative  usurpation  would  be  met  by  force.1 
The  Virginia  Legislature,  in  session  at  the  time,  manifested  a 
spirit  not  to  submit  to  such  usurpation  and  adjourned  only  on 
the  assurance  that  Governor  Monroe  would  convene  them  again 
should  such  a  plan  be  attempted  at  Washington.2 

As  the  time  approached  for  the  decision  by  the  House  it 
became  necessary,  in  the  absence  of  all  precedents,  to  make 
some  rules  by  which  to  conduct  the  election.  The  committee 
appointed,  consisting  of  ten  Federalists  and  six  Republicans,3 
reported  a  set  of  rules  on  February  6th.  The  Republicans  were 
unsuccessful  in  the  attempt  to  change  the  provisions  that  the 
House  should  not  adjourn  till  a  choice  was  made  and  that  the 
balloting  be  done  with  closed  doors.  The  report  was  adopted  as 
presented.  By  these  rules  it  was  decided  that  when  the  House 
returned  from  the  electoral  count,  after  having  provided  seats  for 
the  members  and  President  of  the  Senate,  it  should  ballot  with 
closed  doors,  without  interruption  and  without  adjournment, 
till  a  choice  should  be  made.  The  method  of  balloting  was,  of 
course,  by  States,  the  delegates  of  each  sitting  together.  Each 
delegation  was  to  chose  tellers  if  necessary,  and  the  vote  of  each 
State  was  to  be  prepared,  with  a  duplicate.  The  votes  and  the 
duplicates,  deposited  by  different  persons  in  separate  boxes, 
were  to  be  taken  to  separate  tables  and  there  counted  by  a  com- 
mittee of  one  from  each  State,  who  should  divide  the  work.  If 
they  agreed  in  a  count  the  result  should  be  reported,  if  not,  a 
new  ballot  was  to  be  taken.  When  either  candidate  was  -re- 
ported to  have  a  majority,  the  Speaker  should  declare  it  and 
give  official  notice  to  the  President  and  Senate.  All  questions 
incidental  to  the  choice  were  to  be  decided  by  States,  without 
debate,  a  tie  vote  being  considered  as  negative.  While  these 
rules  were  being  debated  some  of  the  Federal  newspapers,  such 
as  the  Boston  Centinel,  were  advocating  the  election  of  Burr  and 
comparing  him  with  Jefferson,  much  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
latter.  An  "  Essay  by  Eumenes,"  which  appeared  in  the  Wash- 
ington Federalist,  argued  that  in  case  of  no  election  Adams  and 

1  Aurora,  Feb.  9,  1801.     Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  491,  Feb.  15,  1801. 

2  Writings  of  Monroe,  III,  256,  Jan.  18,  1801.     Ill,  257,  Jan.  27,  1801. 

3  Annals  of  Congress  (6th  Congress),  1799-1801,  pp.   987,  990,    1006,  1007, 
1010. 


37 

Jefferson  should  continue  in  office  for  the  ensuing  four  years. 
After  the  balloting  began  the  Federalists  were  urged  '  not  to 
sacrifice  their  duty  shamefully  by  handing  the  Constitution  over 
to  the  hazardous  hands  of  a  foe  so  dangerous  as  Jefferson. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  repeat  the  story  of  the  balloting. 
It  was  begun  on  February  i  ith  and  continued  six  days,  through 
thirty-six  ballots,  in  thirty-five  of  which  the  vote  stood  :  eight 
States  for  Jefferson,  six  for  Burr  and  two  divided.  After  the 
thirtieth  ballot  a  motion  was  made  to  postpone  the  next  ballot 
till  March  3rd,  but  the  motion  was  unanimously  rejected.  When 
it  was  seen  that  Burr  could  not  be  forced  to  commit  himsel£/and 
that  the  Republican  members  could  not  be  coerced  into  voting 
for  him  for  fear  of  continuing  the  deadlock  after  March  3rd, 
Bayard  of  Delaware,  who  practically  held  the  decision  in  his 
hands,  determined  to  settle  the  contest  by  allowing  Jefferson  to 
be  elected.  Jefferson  regarded  the  method  taken  as  a  declara- 
tion of  war,2  for  instead  of  actually  voting  for  him  some  of  the 
Federalists  gave  in  blanks,  thus  throwing  away  the  votes  of 
Delaware  and  South  Carolina  and  giving  him  those  of  Vermont 
and  Maryland.  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island 
and  Connecticut  voted  for  Burr  to  the  end.  The  main  body  of 
the  Federalists  out  of  Congress  condemned  the  action  of  their 
representatives  and  felt  great  relief  when  the  struggle  terminated 
as  it  did. 

As  soon  as  the  election  was  over  the  Aurora  3  voiced  a  very 
general  sentiment  when  it  expressed  the  hope  that  some  change 
would  be  made  in  the  Constitution  which  would  prevent  the 
repetition  of  such  u  disgraceful  scenes  "  as  had  just  taken  place. 
Jefferson's  correspondence  4  just  before  the  election  suggests  the 
need  of  an  amendment.  Later,  in  a  letter  to  Gallatin,  he  men- 
tioned °  an  amendment  which  he  said  would  be  proposed  to  do 
away  with  the  electors  and  have  a  direct  vote  by  the  people,  the 
ticket  having  the  plurality  of  the  vote  of  any  State  to  be  con- 
sidered as  receiving  thereby  the  whole  vote  of  the  State.  This 
does  not  mention  the  designation  of  votes,  and  there  is  no  record 

1  Washington  Federalist,  Feb.  12,  1801. 

2  Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  494,  497. 

3  Aurora,  Feb.  20,  1801. 

*  Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  474,  488,  490,  491. 
5  Ibid,  VII,  94.     Sep,  18,  1801. 


of  its  having  been  offered  in  Congress,  but  from  this  time  for- 
ward the  subject  of  an  amendment  was  agitated  in  the  State 
Legislatures  l  as  well  as  in  Congress. 

As  early  as  1801  Gallatin  discussed  2  the  necessity  for  a 
designating  amendment  to  avoid  embarrassment  in  the  election 
of  a  Vice-President  in  1804.  He  had  discovered  among  a  large 
majority  of  the  Republicans  a  want  of  confidence  in  Burr  of 
which  he  had  not  been  aware  when  he  supported  his  nomina- 
tion. He  spoke  of  that  nomination  as  not  having  been  a  neces- 
sity at  the  time,  and  as  a  capital  fault  if  the  Republicans  were 
determined  not  to  support  him  for  the  eventual  succession. 
There  is  the  evidence  of  Bayard,  who  had  the  whole  matter  in 
his  hands,3  that  Burr  did  not  give  his  definite  co-operation  to  the 
scheme  for  his  election.  Nevertheless  he  trimmed  so  close  to 
the  wind  that  although  the  Republican  press  teemed  with  com- 
pliments upon  his  high  stand  and  his  unwillingness  to  take 
the  place  not  intended  for  him,  distrust  deepened  among  the 
Republican  leaders.  He  was  practically  an  isolated  man  from 
the  time  Jefferson's  administration  began. 

It  is  worth  while  to  notice  just  here  the  part  in  executive 
business  which  had  been  taken  by  Adams  and  Jefferson  while  in 
the  office  of  Vice-President.  Although  Adams  complained  of 
his  office  as  wholly  insignificant  and  the  only  situation  in  the 
world  where  firmness  and  patience  were  useless,4  he  was  con- 
sulted by  Washington  in  many  of  the  most  important  measures 
of  the  government,  in  the  same  manner  as  were  the  Heads  of 
Departments.  In  1789  the  question  of  executive  etiquette5  was 
submitted  to  his  judgment.  In  1790  his  opinion  was  asked6  in 
regard  to  an  important  matter  of  foreign  relations.  When 
Washington  went  on  his  Southern  tovir  in  1791  he  sent  instruc- 
tions 7  to  his  Secretaries  to  consult  Adams  on  important  matters, 
and  this  was  done,  though  informally,  at  a  dinner  given  by 
Jefferson.  In  1794,  Washington  sent  him  the  papers  relating  to 
the  Genet  affair,8  asking  his  advice  in  regard  to  the  proper 

1  Writings  of  Monroe,  III,  317.     Dec.  7,  1801.     To   General   Assembly  of 
Virginia. 

2  Life  of  Gallatin,  p.  287. 

3  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  524.     March  8,  1801. 

*  Works  of  John  Adams,  IX,  573,  Jan.  22,  1791.  5  Ibid,  VIII,  489. 

6  Ibid,  VIII,  496.  7  Writings  of  Jefferson,  I,  165. 

8  Works  of  John  Adams,  VIII,  515. 


39 

policy  to  pursue.  These  examples  are  sufficient  to  show  that 
Adams  was  given  some  place  in  executive  councils,  whether  his 
influence  was  very  great  there  or  not. 

One  of  the  reasons  Madison  advanced  ]  when  urging  Jeffer- 
son to  accept  the  Vice-Presidency  in  1796,  was  the  valuable 
effect  his  proximity  would  have  upon  Adams' councils,  especially 
in  regard  to  foreign  affairs.  Jefferson  replied  2  that,  as  to  duty, 
the  Constitution  would  know  him  only  as  a  member  of  a  legis- 
lative body,  its  principle  being  that  of  a  separation  of  functions, 
except  in  cases  specified.  A  little  later  he  distinctly  stated 3  that 
he  would  take  no  part  whatever  in  executive  consultations  even 
if  it  were  proposed.  That  such  participation  would  not  be  urged 
upon  him  was  natural,  in  view  of  the  height  to  which  party 
spirit  had  risen.  Before  his  inauguration  Adams  called  upon 
Jefferson  and  consulted  him  about  relations  with  France.4  This 
was  the  only  time  that  such  a  consultation  occurred,  for  after 
his  inauguration  and  the  meeting  of  his  Cabinet,  Adams  saw 
the  impossibility  of  including  in  his  councils  the  leader  of  the 
opposition  to  his  administration. 

As  early  as  1796  the  closeness  of  the  race  between  Adams 
and  Jefferson  caused  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  Federalists, 
and  an  amendment  was  offered  for  the  designation  of  votes  by  the 
electors.5  Similar  efforts  were  made  in  1797°  and  I7987  and 
again  in  i8oo,8  but  they  aroused  little  interest  and  the  subject 
was  dropped.  During  the  session  of  i8oo,9  an  amendment  was 
proposed  for  districting  the  States  for  electoral  purposes.  This 
proposal  for  districting  always  appears  in  close  connection  with 
that  for  the  discrimination  in  electoral  votes,  but  was  not  acted 
upon  by  Congress.  In  1802  the  New  York  Legislature  recom- 
mended the  adoption  of  an  amendment  including  both  measures. 
By  these  resolutions  the  States  were  to  be  the  districting 

1  Madison's  Works,  II,  108.    Dec.  19,  1796. 

2  Writings  of  Jefferson,  VII,  108.    Jan.  22,  1797. 

3  Ibid,  VII,  120.     May  13,  1797. 

4  Ibid.  I,  272-273.     March  2,  1797. 

5  Annals  8th  Cong.,  ist  session.     1803-1804.     p.  205. 

6  4th  Cong.,  2d  session,  p.  1824. 

7  Jefferson's  Writings,  VII,  193,  and  sth  Cong.,  Vol.  I,  493, 

8  6th  Cong.,  Feb.  4,  1800,  p.  510. 

9  6th  Cong.,  March  14,  1800,  p.  627. 


40 

organs.  A  curious  misunderstanding  of  this  part  of  the  ques- 
tion seems  -to  have  been  in  the  mind  of  Hamilton,  who  heartily 
approved  of  the  measure,  but  in  letters l  on  the  subject  referred 
to  the  districting  as  under  the  direction  of  the  national  Legisla- 
ture. Such  a  radical  difference  is  the  more  inexplicable  since 
Hamilton  himself  was  the  author  of  the  New  York  resolutions2 
and  must  have  been  aware  of  so  important  a  change  made  in 
his  draft. 

A  review  of  the  attempts  cited  show  that  though  the  desig- 
nating amendment  was  finally  passed  as  a  Republican  party 
measure,  the  earliest  advocates  of  the  principle  involved  were 
the  Federalists.  It  was  recommended  first  by  the  Federalist 
Legislature  of  New  Hampshire,  twice  by  the  Federalist  Legis- 
lature of  South  Carolina,  unanimously  in  New  York,  where  the 
Senate  was  Federalist,  and  at  different  times  by  the  Legislatures 
of  Vermont,  Massachusetts,  Tennessee,  Ohio,  Kentucky  and 
North  Carolina,  and  the  indications  are  that  in  so  far  as  it  was 
a  party  measure  at  first  it  was  Federalist. 

On  February  15,  1802,  the  New  York  resolutions  were  pre- 
sented in  the  House  by  the  Republicans,  and  on  April  I2th  in 
the  Senate.  The  districting  portion  was  dropped  and  the  rest 
of  the  question  was  not  taken  up  again  in  the  House  till  May 
ist,  when  its  consideration  was  objected  to  on  account  of  the 
late  period  of  the  session,  when  members  were  occupied  in  pre- 
paring to  depart  and  "  in  packing  up  their  clothes,  with  which 
they  had  packed  up  many  of  their  ideas."  Huger,  of  South 
Carolina,  who  afterwards  opposed  the  amendment,  declared  him- 
self in  favor  of  the  principle,  but  protested  against  taking  such 
an  important  step  so  hastily.  He  pointed  out  that  there  was 
scarcely  a  quorum  and  that  were  all  the  Federalists  present  they 
would  have  more  than  the  third  necessary  to  defeat  the  measure. 
The  question  being  taken  on  the  amendment,3  it  was  lost  in 
Committee  of  the  Whole,  but  the  House  refused  to  concur  in 
the  report  and  on  the  third  reading  it  was  carried  4  and  sent  to 
the  Senate. 

The  lack   of  argument  on  the  merits  of  the  question,  the 

1  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  531,  to  G.  Morris  ;  VI,  536.       (To  Bayard  and  not 
to  Morris,  as  is  given  in  his  Works). 

2  Ibid,  VII,  836.  3  7th  Congress,  ist  session,  p.  1291. 
4  By  vote  of  47  yeas  to  14  nays. 


long  postponement  from  February  iQth  till  May  ist,  and  the 
haste  with  which  it  was  pushed  through,  seem  to  substantiate 
Huger's  charge  that  it  was  a  party  measure  and  that  the  course 
taken  in  regard  to  it  was  a  high-handed  method  of  gaining  an 
end  which  could  not  have  been  gained  if  an  ordinary  course 
had  been  pursued.  From  being  a  Federalist  measure  it  had 
changed  to  a  Republican  one  and  there  was  a  complete  reversal 
of  party  action  on  the  subject.  This  change  is  further  empha- 
sized by  what  took  place  in  the  Senate.1  There  is  no  record  of 
any  debate.  On  May  3d,  the  amendment  as  sent  from  the 
House  was  taken  up,  put  to  vote  and  lost,  the  vote 2  not  being 
the  necessary  two-thirds.  That  it  was  lost  was  due  to  the  vote 
of  Gouverneur  Morris,  and  since  he  represented  New  York, 
which  had  unanimously  recommended  it,  he  felt  it  necessary  to 
explain  his  conduct.  This  he  did  in  a  letter  to  the  Senate  and 
Assembly  of  New  York  8  in  which  he  gave  these  reasons :  that 
he  was  opposed  to  amendments  on  the  general  ground  that  they 
lessened  respect  for  the  constitutional  compact,  that  it  is  better 
to  bear  the  evils  we  know  than  to  hazard  those  we  are  unac- 
quainted with  and  that  the  existing  mode  seemed  preferable  to 
the  change  proposed.  That  such  flimsy  excuses  should,  have 
been  offered  by  a  man  of  Morris'  keen  mind  in  the  face  of  the 
events  of  1801  argues  a  motive  other  than  personal  opinion,  and 
this  could  have  been  no  other  than  a  party  motive.  In  the 
second  session  of  the  Seventh  Congress  an  amendment  embody- 
ing the  designating  principle  was  again  introduced,4  and  on 
February  8th  it  was  urgently  called  for  by  Bayard  (Del.).  It 
was  charged  that  his  urgency  was  due  to  the  absence  of  Repub- 
lican members  from  the  Senate  by  which  the  amendment  could 
be  defeated,  even  if  carried  in  the  House. 

Bayard  had  formerly  expressed  his  approval  of  the 
amendment,5  but  had  voted  against  it  with  the  other  Feder- 
alists the  previous  May,  and  now  declared  his  intention  to  do  so 
again.  But  the  House  refused  to  take  up  the  amendment  and 
voted  to  postpone  it  till  the  first  Monday  in  November.  The 
new  Congress  would  then  be  in  session  and  it  was  hoped  that 
the  Republicans  would  have  a  two-thirds  majority. 

Seventh  Congress,  ist  Session,  p.  304.  2 15  yeas,  8  nays. 

3  "Life  and  Writings  of  Gouverneur  Morris,"  Sparks,  III,  173. 

4  Seventh  Congress,  2d  Session,  p.  304. 

5  Hamilton's  Works,  VI,  539. 


42 

When  the  Eighth  Congress  met,  this  was  a  fact.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  Congress  the  Republicans  had  a  majority 
large  enough  to  pass  a  constitutional  amendment  should  it  be 
treated  as  a  party  question  and  the  lines  be  strictly  drawn 
between  Republicans  and  Federalists.  The  subject  was  taken 
up  the  very  first  day,  not  even  waiting  till  the  time  agreed  upon 
the  previous  session.  The  discussion  falls  under  three  heads — 
that  in  the  House  on  its  Resolutions,  sent  to  the  Senate  but  not 
acted  upon  by  that  body,  that  in  the  Senate  on  its  own  Resolu- 
tions, and  that  in  the  House  on  concurrence  in  the  Senate  Bill. 

October  17,  1803,  Dawson  (Va.)  moved  :  "  That  in  all  future 
elections  of  President  and  Vice-President,  the  persons  shall  be 
particularly  designated,  by  declaring  which  is  voted  for  as  Presi- 
dent and  which  as  Vice-President."  l  An  amendment  was  offered 
to  this  resolution,2  that  u  the  person  voted  for  as  President 
having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  shall  be  President,  if  such 
number  be  a  majority  of  all  the  electors  appointed,  and  if  no 
person  have  such  a  majority,  then  from  the  five  highest  on  the 
list  of  those  voted  for  as  President,  the  House  of .  Representa- 
tives shall  immediately  choose  by  ballot  one  of  them  as  Presi- 
dent. And  in  every  case  the  person  voted  for  as  Vice-President 
having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  shall  be  the  Vice-President. 
But  if  there  should  be  two  or  more  who  have  equal  votes,  the  Sen- 
ate shall  choose  one  of  them  for  Vice-President."  A  further  amend- 
ment was  offered  to  substitute  the  number  two  for  five  in  the  list 
to  be  submitted  to  the  House.  A  committee  of  seventeen,  one 
from  each  State,  was  appointed  to  consider  the  resolutions,  and 
Huger  moved  that  the  other  resolutions  of  the  New  York 
Legislature,  respecting  the  electoral  districting,  be  referred  to 
the  same  committee.  When  the  committee  reported3  this  part 
of  the  subject  had  been  quietly  dropped  and  does  not  again 
directly  appear  in  the  debates.  The  number  three  had  been 
substituted  for  five  on  the  eligible  list.  This  introduced  one  of 
the  three  points  upon  which  the  chief  discussion  hinged  in  the 
first  debate  in  the  House.  It  was  argued  by  the  Federalists  that 
no  great  danger  could  ensue  from  allowing  a  latitude  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  since  they,  as  well  as  the  electors, 

1  Eighth  Congress,  ist  Session  (1803-1804),  p.  372. 

'2  Oct.  19,  by  Nicholson.  3  Oct.  24. 


43 

were  chosen  by  the  people.     It  was  even  moved  that  the  list  be 
extended  to  the  whole  number  voted  for.1 

When  the  question  was  put  the  number  five  was  substituted 
by  a  vote  of  59  to  47.  This  was  due  to  the  fact  there  was  a 
division  of  sentiment  in  the  Republican  party  itself,  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  small  States  being  so  opposed  to  the  reduc- 
tion that  they  were  willing  to  sacrifice  the  amendment  rather 
than  allow  it  to  pass  with  the  smaller  number.  This  feeling 
was  due  to  the  fear  of  a  diminution  of  the  influence  of  the 
small  States  which  such  a  reduction  in  the  number  would  effect. 
The  discriminating  principle  itself  was  attacked  on  this  ground 
by  the  Federalists,  and  severely  denounced 2  because  it  would 
have  a  tendency  to  keep  the  election  out  of  the  House,  thus 
destroying  one  chance  which  the  small  States  had  of  influencing 
the  eventual  choice.  In  answer  to  these  arguments,  the  Repub- 
licans opposed  political  theories.  The  electors  were  the  organs, 
it  was  said,3  who,  acting  from  a  certain  and  unquestioned  knowl- 
edge of  the  choice  of  the  people,  and  under  immediate  responsi- 
bility to  them,  selected  and  announced  the  particular  citizens 
upon  whom  the  public  confidence  was  bestowed.  It  was  a 
primary  and  essential  attribute  of  the  government  that  the  will 
of  the  people  should  be  done  and  that  the  elections  should  be 
according  to  this  will.  The  highest  ground  was  taken  in  oppo- 
sition to  this  democratic,  nationalizing  tendency  by  Huger. 
Although  a  Federalist,  his  arguments  were  a  strong  defense  of 
State  Rights,  opposing  concrete  facts  to  abstract  democratic 
reasoning.  The  Republicans  wanted  to  pass  an  amendment  in 
conformity  with  what  they  thought  ought  to  be ;  he  took  the 
ground  of  strict  construction,  standing  on  the  Constitution  as 
presented  by  the  Convention.  He  regarded  the  amendment  as  a 
question  between  the  States,  involving  the  vital  principle  upon 
which  the  Federal  compact  was  formed,  namely,  the  jarring 
interests  and  pretensions  of  the  large  and  small  States.  Empha- 
sizing the  federative  principle,  he  deprecated  the  abstract  view, 
which,  going  back  to  a  state  of  nature,  seemed  to  regard  it  as  a 
radical  error  in  the  Constitution  that  its  provisions  were  not 
founded  on  the  broad  basis  of  population  and  numbers.  The 

1  Lost  by  vote  of  29  yeas,  77  nays. 

2  Annals  8th  Congress,  ist  Session,  p.  517.     Griswold  (N.  Y.). 

3  Ibid,  p.  423.      Clopton  (Va.). 


44 

rights  of  man  in  a  state  of  nature,  the  origin  of  the  social  com- 
pact and  the  "  will  of  the  people  "  as  the  foundation  of  all  gov- 
ernment he  brushed  aside  as  irrelevant,  since  the  Union  was  not 
composed  of  a  people  rising  for  the  first  time  into  political 
existence,  but  of  independent  sovereignties  with  distinct  and 
complicated  interests.  It  therefore  appeared  to  him  that  the 
amendment  gave  a  death  blow  to  the  portion  of  sovereignty 
reserved  to  the  States,  and  was  a  monstrous  stride  towards  that 
very  consolidation  of  the  States  of  which  the  Republicans  had 
been  accustomed  so  bitterly  to  complain. 

The  other  question  discussed  at  this  time  related  to  the 
Vice-Presidency.  It  was  said  by  the  Federalists  that  it  was 
to  prevent  intrigue  and  the  absolute  power  of  one  party  that 
the  office  of  Vice-President  was  instituted  ;  that  the  proposed 
amendment  would  make  that  officer  a  useless  expense  ;  that 
he  would  have  no  other  duties  than  such  as  devolve  upon  the 
Speaker  of  the  House,  besides  being  able  from  his  proximity  to 
the  Government  to  cabal  with  greater  effect  for  the  succession.1 
Huger  regarded  this  question  also  in  the  light  of  the  rights 
of  the  small  States.  He  urged  that  the  constitutional  mode  of 
election  created  a  moral  necessity  on  the  part  of  the  electors  to 
bring  forward  the  most  prominent  characters  as  well  to  fill  the 
office  of  Vice-President  as  that  of  President.  This  was  a  bold 
statement  in  the  face  of  the  recognition  of  political  expediency 
shown  in  Burr's  nomination,  however  true  it  might  be  theoreti- 
cally. The  indiscriminate  mode  afforded  the  small  States  a  great 
degree  of  influence  over  the  final  choice,  especially  if  the  large 
States,  to  secure  the  Presidency,  threw  away  their  second  votes. 
His  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  office  exceeded  that  generally 
made  and  is  important  as  an  index  to  the  possibilities  of  the 
situation  under  a  strong  personality.  As  will  be  pointed  out 
later,  it  is  in  this  connection  that  the  amendment  has  had  one 
of  its  most  marked  effects.  That  the  Vice-Presidency  was  more 
than  a  "  respectable  situation  "  was  shown  by  John  Adams,  who 
had  spoken  of  it  in  this  ironical  way.  He  had  been  able  to  do 
much  by  positive  acts  of  individual  authority,  and  by  his  casting 
vote  had  exercised  a  powerful  influence  in  giving  permanent 
form  and  character  to  the  government.  However,  it  must  be 

1  Ibid,  p.  540. 


45 

said  that  at  that  time  parties,  strictly -speaking,  had  not  been 
organized  and  majorities  were  not  formed  by  men  who  might, 
in  their  private  convictions,  be  on  the  other  side  of  the  question. 
When  this  happened  the  influence  of  the  Vice-President  in  the 
Senate  decreased. 

Finally  the  resolution,  as  amended  in  a  few  minor  points, 
was  agreed  to  l  and  sent  to  the  Senate  for  concurrence.  Before 
receiving  the  House  resolution  the  Senate  had  taken  up  the 
matter. 

October  2ist,  Clinton  (N.  Y.)  introduced  a  resolution  for  dis- 
crimination of  votes  in  very  nearly  the  wording  eventually 
adopted.2  The  number  on  the  eligible  list  was  left  blank,  but 
no  provision  was  made  for  non-election  in  the  House.  The 
resolution,  as  first  introduced,  was  significant  of  the  haste  with 
which  it  was  constructed.  It  contained  a  palpable  absurdity  by 
providing  for  the  case  of  two  persons  having  a  majority,  an  im- 
possibility under  the  designating  principle. 

Realizing  that  the  requisite  two-thirds  majority  would 
depend  upon  the  careful  guarding  of  every  Republican  vote, 
Clinton  tried  to  rush  the  amendment  through,  as  it  would  be 
necessary  for  him  to  leave  the  Senate  in  a  few  days.3  It  was 
brought  up  on  Friday  and  he  proposed  to  have  a  second  reading 
on  Saturday,  so  that  the  third  might  be  had  on  Monday  and 
final  action  taken  that  day.  The  subject  was  too  keenly  in- 
teresting to  allow  the  method  so  nearly  successful  in  1802  to 
be  effective,  and  on  October  25th,  Clinton  having  gone  home, 
it  was  postponed  till  November  23d.4  While  postponement 
was  being  discussed,  an  amendment  was  proposed  which  was 
afterwards  carried,  that  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  electors 
be  requisite  for  a  choice  of  Vice-President  as  well  as  of  Presi- 
dent. Another  amendment  was  offered,5  to  which  little  notice 
was  given,  though  lost  by  a  majority  of  only  one,  viz  :  "  That 
at  the  next  election  of  President  no  person  should  be  eligible 
who  had  served  more  than  eight  years,  and  in  all  future  elec- 
tions no  person  should  be  eligible  more  than  four  years  in  any 
period  of  eight  years." 

As  in  the  debates  in  the  House  the  chief  discussion  was  on 
the  number  on  the  eligible  list  in  relation  to  the  influence  of 

1  Ibid,  p.  544.     Vote:  88  yeas,  31  nays.     Oct.  28.  2  Ibid,  p.  16. 

3  Ibid,  p.  19.  *  Ibid,  p.  26.     .        '  5  Ibid,  p.  19.'     Butler  (S.  C:). 


46 

the  small  States  and  on  the  Vice-Presidency,  though  other  points 
were  brought  out.  When  the  resolutions  were  again  taken  up 
the  main  interest  centered  in  filling  the  blank  left  in  regard  to 
the  number  of  persons  to  be  selected  from  if  the  choice  fell  to 
the  House.  Five,  three,  and  even  two  were  suggested,  and  three 
was  finally  decided  upon.  This  called  forth  a  storm  of  remon- 
strance as  a  conspiracy  against  the  influence  of  the  smaller 
States.  The  danger  which  seemed  to  him  to  threaten  South  Caro- 
lina as  one  of  that  group  overcame  the  Republicanism  and  former 
favorable  attitude  of  Butler.  He  felt  that  the  amendment  would 
give  the  choice  of  President  to  the  four  large  States  to  the  per- 
petual exclusion  of  the  others,  and  he  enunciated  it  as  a  reason- 
able principle  l  that  every  State  should  in  turn  have  the  choice 
of  the  chief  magistrate  made  from  among  its  citizens.  If  this 
were  carried  out  at  the  present  day  it  is  an  interesting  mathe- 
matical problem  how  long  each  State  would  have  to  wait  its 
turn,  with  forty-five  States  and  a  term  often  of  eight  years. 
Butler  had  been  a  member  of  the  Convention  of  1787  and  felt 
himself  to  be  as  one  who  spoke  with  authority.  He  referred  to 
the  debates  there  and  ended  with  the  warning,  "  Beware  of  the 

great  States ! Pass  this  amendment  and  no  man  can 

live  in  the  small  States  but  under  disparaging  circumstances, 
they  will  have  about  as  many  rights  left  in  society  as  the  Helots 
of  Greece."  2 

John  Quincy  Adams  also  disapproved  of  the  alteration  from 
five  to  three 3  and  called  upon  some  champion  of  the  small  States 
to  vindicate  their  rights.  He  afterwards  shifted  his  position 
and  based  his  opposition  on  federative  grounds,  stating  that  the 
principles  of  the  Federal  compact  were  attacked  rather  than 
the  rights  of  the  small  States,  following  the  arguments  offered 
in  the  House  by  Huger.  He  finally  stated  that  his  vote  on  the 
subject  would  be  governed  by  the  number  five,  since  he  approved 
of  the  other  principle  involved.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
had  he  been  successful  in  extending  the  list,  his  own  election  to 
the  Presidency  would  have  been  improbable.  Had  Clay  been  on 
the  list  in  1825,  when  the  election  was  thrown  into  the  House, 
Adams  would  hardly  have  been  elected.4 

Other    Federalists    vociferously    protested    against    being 

1  Ibid,  p.  23.  a  Ibid,  p.  207.  3  Ibid,  p.  87. 

4  Burgess,  "Middle  Period,"  p.  140. 


47 

"  bound  hand  and  foot  and  delivered  over  to  four  or  five  of  the 
large  States,"  l  which,  they  affected  to  believe,  were  ready  to 
combine  and  use  force  to  gain  their  ends.  Not  only  was  the 
decrease  in  number  regarded  as  an  attack  on  the  rights  of  the 
small  States,  but  the  whole  amendment  was  condemned  as  hav- 
ing this  effect.  It  prevented  the  necessity  for  throwing  away 
votes  on  the  part  of  the  large  States  which  had  enabled  the 
small  States  to  concentrate  and  put  in  a  Vice-Presiclent.2  Its 
tendency  to  keep  the  election  out  of  the  House  was  again  urged 
as  an  argument  against  it.  The  Republicans  answered  the  first 
of  these  objections  by  saying  that  it  was  not  the  intention  of 
the  Constitution  that  the  majority  of  the  people  should  be  driven 
by  an  unforseen  state  of  parties  to  relinquish  their  will  in  the 
election  of  either  officer  nor  that  the  principle  of  majority,  in  a 
function  confided  to  the  popular  will,  should  be  deprived  of  half 
of  its  rights  and  be  laid  under  the  necessity  of  violating  its  duty 
to  preserve  the  other  half.3  In  regard  to  the  eventual  election 
by  the  House,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  controversy  was  not 
between  the  larger  and  smaller  States,  but  between  the  people 
of  every  State  and  the  House  of  Representatives,  since  the  elec- 
tion by  that  body  was  never  intended  to  be  converted  into  the 
active  rule  and  thus  destroy  the  line  of  separation  between  the 
executive  and  legislative  power.  It  was  stated  that  such  an 
election  by  the  House  exposed  the  country  to  the  evils  Great 
Britain  had  suffered  through  the  rotten  borough  system 4  and 
the  chance  of  being  governed  by  a  minority  was  lessened  by 
lessening  the  number  on  the  eligible  list.  The  number  three 
was  more  in  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  since  it  placed  the 
choice  more  certainly  in  the  hands  of  the  people.5 

The  league  of  the  large  States,  conspiring  against  the  small, 
which  was  held  up  by  the  opposition  as  a  sure  and  frightful  con- 
sequence, was  discussed  and  it  was  pointed  out  very  clearly6 
that  the  large  States  were  more  jealous  of  each  other  than  of  the 
small,  and  it  was  absurd  to  think  of  a  combination  between 
Massachusetts  and  Virginia,  for  instance,  or  Massachusetts  and 
New  York.  The  more  natural  course  was  indicated  later7  in 

1  Annals  8th  Congress,  ist  session,  p.  87.  2  Ibid,  p.  139. 

3  Ibid,  p.  181.     Taylor  (Va.).  *  Ibid,  p.  100. 

5  Ibid,  p.  103.     Nicholas  (Va.).  6  Ibid,  p.  114.    Jackson  (Ga.). 

7  Ibid,  p.  704.     In  House  by  Gregg  (Pa.). 


48 

the  statement  that  the  combinations  would  be  of  sections — 
Eastern,  Middle,  and  Southern;  Pennsylvania  might  join  with 
New  Jersey,  Delaware  and  Maryland,  but  never  with  Virginia 
or  Massachusetts.1 

The  narrowing  of  the  number  was  necessary,  it  was  said, 
to  prevent  the  House  from  electing  a  man  evidently  not  in- 
tended by  the  people.  As  for  rotation,  the  most  farsighted 
statement  in  regard  to  party  made  during  the  debate  was  that  of 
Jackson  (Ga.),  who  said  he  did  not  consider  it  a  matter  of 
any  consequence  from  what  State  a  President  was  chosen  ;  while 
parties  existed  there  would  be  a  champion  chosen  by  each,  irre- 
spective of  the  State  of  which  he  was  a  resident.2  In  sharp 
contrast  with  this  was  the  prophecy  that  the  insertion  of  the 
number  three  would  cause  an  opposition  of  one  on  each  side  for 
President  and  a  third  between  both  for  Vice-President.3 

As  usual  the  truth  lies  between  the  two  extremes.  Butler's 
alarm,  so  loudly  sounded,  concerning  the  degradation  of  the 
citizens  of  the  small  States  to  the  place  of  Helots,  should  the 
amendment  pass,  was  going  too  far.  But  it  is  a  fact  that  there 
has  never  been  a  Presidential  candidate  from  one  of  the  very 
small  States  and  it  is  unlikely  that  one  will  ever  be  put  up. 
The  question  arises,  however,  whether  this  would  not  have  been 
so  anyway.  That  he  was  from  a  State  too  small  to  carry  any 
weight  was  an  argument  adduced  against  the  candidacy  of 
Bayard  of  Delaware  in  1876,  and  it  is  possible  that  had  Ed- 
munds, of  Vermont,  been  from  a  larger  State  his  chances  for 
the  nomination  would  have  been  much  greater  in  1884.  There 
could  be  no  realization  of  the  prophecy  concerning  the  combina- 
tion of  the  large  States,  as  such,  for  party  not  State  is  the 
controlling  factor.  In  the  politics  of  1801-1809  the  harmony 
between  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  is  not  a  contradiction  but  a 
confirmation  of  this. 

During  the  debate  on  postponement  the  question  of  the 
Vice-Presidency  had  been  brought  up  by  a  motion  to  strike  out 
all  the  portions  concerning  that  office/  the  advantages  of  which 
would  be  destroyed,  it  was  alleged,  should  the  amendment  be 

1  It  was   argued  against  the  number  three  that  a  Western  section  would 
grow  up  and  it  would  then  be  excluded. 

2  Annals  8th  Congress,  ist  Session,  p.  113. 

3  Ibid,  p.  87.  4  Ibid,  p.  21. 


49 

adopted.  This  motion  was  lost,  but  the  discussion  continued  at 
a  later  date.  The  charge  was  made  that  the  eagerness  to  pass 
the  amendment  at  this  time  grew  out  of  a  desire  to  put  it  into 
operation  before  the  next  election  and  so  prevent  a  Federal 
Vice-President  from  coming  in.  This  was  met  by  the  candid 
avowal  of  such  a  purpose  l  on  the  part  of  the  leading  Republi- 
cans. After  discussing  the  aim  of  the  Convention  in  the  mode  of 
election,  to  put  a  man  of  worth  in  both  stations,  the  Federalists 
argued  that  if  the  amendment  was  carried,  character,  talents  or 
virtue  would  not  be  sought  after  in  the  Vice-Presidential  candi- 
date. The  question  would  not  be  asked  "  Is  he  honest  ?"  "Is 
he  capable?"  but  "Can  he  by  his  name,  by  his  connections,  by 
his  wealth,  by  his  local  situation,  by  his  influence  or  by  his  in- 
trigues best  promote  the  election  of  a  President?"2  The  office 
would  be  sent  to  market  with  hardly  a  chance  for  an  honest  pur- 
chaser.3 It  would  be  a  sinecure.  An  ambitious  candidate  for  the 
Presidency  would  not  promote  the  election  of  a  man  who  might 
prove  his  rival,  but  would  support  one  of  moderate  talents,  whose 
influence  would  aid  his  own  election.4  They  did  not  seem  to 
realize  that  what  they  were  predicting  for  the  future  under  the 
amendment,  had  already  happened  under  the  old  mode  of  election. 
Pinckney  had  been  selected  by  the  Federalists  in  1796  as  a  man 
who  would  "cause  a  diversion  of  Southern  blows"5  and  Burr  was 
supported  by  the  Republicans  in  1796  and  1800  for  the  Vice- 
Presidency,  though  the  Constitution  forbade  any  such  discrimi- 
nation. He  was  put  forward,  unscrupulous  as  they  knew  him 
to  be,  simply  to  ensure  the  election  of  Jefferson  by  bringing 
in  the  vote  of  New  York.  Yet  the  very  fact  that  he  might 
have  become  President,  as  the  Federalists  attempted  to  make 
him  in  the  election  of  1801,  was  some  check  upon  such  party 
measures.  The  amendment  took  away  this  danger,  and  the 
predictions  of  the  Federalists  have  come  literally  true.  To 
be  Vice-President  is  to  be  politically  "shelved,"  and  men  of 
the  first  class  with  political  aspirations  refuse  to  take  the  office. 
Although  four  times  already  in  our  comparatively  short  history 
the  Vice-President  has  become  President,  it  seems  to  be  the 

1  Ibid,  pp.  22,  128,  178,  186.  2  Ibid,  p.  144. 

3  Ibid,  p.  173,  Tracy  (Conn.).  *  Ibid,  p.  155.     Plumber  (N.  H.). 

5  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King  (Putman),  II,  46.     Hamiltons' 
Works,  VI,  114. 


5° 

custom  of  National  Conventions  to  make  the  nominations  for 
that  office  entirely  irrespective  of  the  fact  that  its  incumbent 
may  become  the  chief  magistrate.  Ignoring  this  possibility 
parties  sometimes  chose  a  man  for  the  second  place  who  has 
radically  different  opinions  on  vital  points  from  the  person 
selected  for  President.  In  1888  the  Democratic  nominee  was 
Allen  G.  Thurman,  a  man  at  that  time  seventy-five  years 
old,  and  in  1892  Stevenson  held  some  very  different  views 
from  his  chief  on  the  currency  question. 

That  the  President  and  Vice-President  should  be  of  different 
parties  "  to  check  and  preserve  in  temper  the  over-heated  zeal  of 
party"  was  advocated  by  Hillhouse  (Conn.)  in  a  speech  that  should 
be  noted  as  a  glaring  example  of  the  utter  inability  of  the  Feder- 
alists to  realize  the  revolution  that  had  already  taken  place  in 
politics  and  the  immense  distance  that  the  politicians  of  1803  stood 
from  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  in  1787.  He  declared  the  cal- 
culation that  all  the  States  in  the  Union  would  vote  for  the  same 
persons,  or  that  each  of  the  two  parties  opposed  in  politics  would 
have  an  individual  candidate  to  be  visionary.  His  statement 
that  both  candidates  could  not  be  chosen  from  the  same  State  is 
an  error  which  is  still  commonly  noted.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
provision  that  the  electors  shall  vote  for  two  men,  "  one  of 
whom  at  least  shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  same  State  with 
themselves,"  would  not  prevent  the  electors  from  every  State 
except  one  voting  for  two  men  from  that  State,  and  thus  elect- 
ing both  candidates  from  it.  It  is  improbable  that  political 
expediency  will  ever  demand  such  a  course,  the  tendency  being 
in  the  opposite  direction,  but  there  is  no  constitutional  obstacle 
in  the  way.  Hillhouse  ended  his  argument  by  saying  :  "  For 
once  or  twice  there  may  be  such  an  organization  of  party  as 
will  secure  for  a  conspicuous  character  a  majority  of  votes. 
But  that  character  cannot  live  always.  The  evils  of  the  last 
election  will  recur  and  be  greater  because  the  whole  field  will 

be  to  range  in If  we  cannot  destroy  party, 

we  ought  to  place  every  check  upon  it." 

This  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  great  result  of  the  amend- 
ment in  its  practical  development.  The  enormous  consequence 
of  it  has  been  to  make  party  government  constitutional.  It  has 
made  it  imperative  that  the  President  and  Vice-President  be  party 


representatives  and  practically  impossible  that  they  be  chosen  at 
the  outset  from  different  parties,  unless  the  election  devolves  upon 
the  House  or  Senate.  This  legalization  of  party  control  in  the 
government  was  a  change  of  the  Constitution  in  one  of  the  most 
basic  principles.  The  leading  idea  of  the  Convention  had  been 
to  prevent  the  rule  of  party.  Washington  had  inaugurated  the 
government  by  adhering  to  this  idea,  and  against  heavy  odds 
had  attempted  to  keep  himself  out  of  and  above  parties,  by- 
combining  in  his  cabinet  representatives  of  the  diverging  ten- 
dencies. But  even  before  he  retired  from  the  Presidency  this 
was  becoming  an  impossibility,  and  he  drifted  more  and  more 
into  the  the  channel  of  the  Federalists.  When  Adams  came  in 
the  change  to  party  rule  was  practically  accomplished  and  a 
great  part  of  the  difficulties  he  encountered  came  from  the  fact 
that  he  did  not  fully  realize  this.  His  practice  differed  so  wide- 
ly from  the  ever-growing  tendency  that  conflict  was  inevitable. 
By  the  time  of  the  election  of  1801  the  revolution  was  com- 
plete ;  parties  had  become  separated  into  opposing  armies,  each  • 
with  its  own  general  and  staff  of  officers.  The  amendment  was 
simply  a  legalization  of  what  had  become  fact.  It  would  have 
been  just  as  reasonable  to  advise  the  armies  of  two  opposing 
nations  to  have  their  generals  in  common,  selecting  either  this 
one  or  that,  indiscriminately,  to  conduct  an  impending  battle, 
as  to  urge  the  impending  parties  to  concentrate  their  votes  upon 
one  man  for  Vice-President. 

Another  question  which  occupied  the  attention  of  the  Sen- 
ate was  introduced  by  an  amendment,  offered  by  Pickering 
(Mass.),  to  insert,  "  But  if  within  twenty-four  hours  no  election 
shall  have  taken  place,1  then  the  President  shall  be  chosen  by 
law."  WThen  asked  what  was  meant  by  a  person  "chosen  by 
law,"  he  replied  that  the  States  might  choose  by  lot,  or  by  bal- 
lots in  a  box  which  the  President  might  collect,  or  a  number 
of  names  might  be  put  in  a  box  from  which  the  Speaker 
might  draw  one.  This  was  defended  as  having  precedent  in 
the  Constitution  of  Kentucky  and  in  the  ancient  Grecian 
States,  but  was  ridiculed  by  the  Republicans,  who  suggested 
that  the  question  might  be  settled  by  the  old  mode  of  "  grand 
battaile,"  or  by  the  champions  of  both  parties,  armed  with 

1  When  the  election  devolved  upon  the  House. 

2  Annals  8th  Congress,  ist  session,  p.  128. 


52 

tomahawks.  Seriously  speaking,  this  was  taking  the  elec- 
tion out  of  the  hands  of  the  people  and  trying  to  determine  an 
important  principle  of  effective  government  by  a  non-effective 
act.  As  was  said  at  the  time,  it  was  trying  to  determine  an 
election  by  holding  out  a  temptation  to  non-election.  The 
defect  having  been  pointed  out,  however,  several  amendments 
were  offered  to  remedy  it.1  The  one  which  was  adopted2  pro- 
vided that  the  Vice-President  should  succeed  as  in  any  other  case 
of  disability,  if,  when  the  election  devolved  upon  the  House,  a 
President  should  not  be  chosen  before  the  4th  of  March.  This 
made  no  provision  for  the  non-election  of  Vice-President  also,  but 
no  case  of  the  kind  has  ever  arisen,  nor  is  it  likely  to  under  the 
present  party  system.  Amendments  to  cover  such  a  case  were  lost. 
There  was  a  constitutional  question  raised  by  Tracy  in  re- 
gard to  instructions  which  was  not  directly  discussed,  but  the 
subject  of  which  was  referred  to  by  various  speakers.3  He 
drew  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  appropriate  duties  of  the 
States  and  of  Congress  in  reference  to  amendments,  and  he 
denied  the  right  of  the  former  to  give  instructions  to  members 
of  Congress  in  regard  to  them.  u  As  well  and  with  as  much 
propriety  might  Congress  make  a  law  attempting  to  bind  the 
State  Legislatures  to  ratify.  In  either  case,  the  check,  which, 
for  obviously  wise  purposes,  was  introduced  into  the  Constitu- 
tion, is  destroyed,"  was  his  conclusion.  No  attempt  was  made 
to  refute  this  argument,  but  it  was  said  that  a  recommendation 
through  their  State  Legislatures  is  the  most  dignified  method  of 
expressing  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  a  State  on  a  subject 
so  important  as  a  constitutional  amendment,  and  such  expres- 
sions should  have  weight  with  Congress.  The  other  mode  of 
amendment  provided  in  the  Constitution  is  evidence  that  the 
Convention  meant  the  clearly  expressed  desire  of  the  people  to 
have  force.  This  method  has  never  been  formally  used,  but  it 
is  an  interesting  illustration  of  extra-constitutional  development 
that  its  principle  of  initiation  by  the  States  has  been  repeatedly 
put  into  practice.  When  the  State  feels  the  need  of  an  amend- 
ment its  Legislature  passes  resolutions  formulating  the  desired 
measure.  Copies  are  sent  to  the  other  States  and  a  reply  is 
usually  returned.  If  it  is  seen  that  the  requisite  three-fourths 

1  Ibid,  p.  132.    J.  Q.  Adams.  2  Ibid,  p.  136.     Taylor  (Va.). 

3  Ibid,  p.  177. 


53 

are  not  in  favor  of  it'  the  matter  is  dropped,  as  it  would  be  use- 
less to  take  further  steps.  If  the  replies  are  favorable,  an 
attempt  is  made  to  push  the  amendment  through  Congress.  A 
good  example  of  this  is  the  attempt  of  Massachusetts  to  change 
the  Federal  representation  in  iSozj..1  Her  resolutions  on  the 
matter  were  answered  by  all  but  two  States,  and  as  the  replies 
were  unanimous  in  their  disapproval,  she  abandoned  the  pro- 
ject. On  the  other  hand,  the  action  of  Congress  in  compelling 
the  States  to  ratify  an  amendment  was  mentioned  by  Tracy  as  a 
reductio  ad absurdiim,  simply  to  give  point  to  his  remarks.  But 
when  we  consider  the  history  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  we 
find  that  thing  had  come  to  pass  which  sixty  years  before  had 
been  passed  over  in  silence  as  a  mere  rhetorical  figure.  The 
ratification  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  virtually  com- 
pulsory, since  the  "  check  "  on  Congress  had  been  thrown  off  by 
that  body  and  the  responsibility  for  constitutional  amendments, 
instead  of  being  divided  between  national  and  State  Legisla- 
tures, according  to  Constitutional  provisions,  was  assumed 
entirely  by  the  former. 

When  the  vote  was  taken,1  the  question  was  carried  22 
yeas  to  10  nays.  Immediately  Tracy  denied  that  it  was  con- 
stitutionally passed,  since  two-thirds  of  those  present  (22)  and 
not  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  Senators  (23)  had 
voted  in  the  affirmative.  This  had  been  in  the  mind  of  Clinton 
in  his  effort  to  rush  the  amendment  through,  and  Tracy  had 
attempted,  in  a  former  speech,  to  forstall  the  result,  but  the 
President  declared  the  question  carried  by  the  necessary  majority 
in  conformity  with  the  Constitution  and  former  usage.  As  thus 
finally  passed  by  the  Senate,  the  amendment  was  in  the  form 
now  in  the  Constitution.  An  attempt  was  made  to  have  it  sub- 
mitted to  the  President  for  his  approbation,  but  this  was  nega- 
tived by  a  large  majority.'2 

When  the  House  received  the  amendment  from  the  Senate  3 
objections  were  immediately  raised  because  the  Senate  had  not 
acted  on  the  House  resolutions  and  because  the  vote  was  not  by 
two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  Senators.  The  first  objec- 

1  McMaster,  III,  45-47. 

2  December  2.        2  Annals  8th  Congress,  ist  session,  pp    214-215.     Ames: 
"Proposed  Amendments." 

3  Ibid,  p.  646,  Dec.  6. 


54 

tion  was  quickly  overruled  and  precedents  were  adduced  and 
arguments  offered  to  show  that  the  second  was  not  a  true  inter- 
pretation of  the  Constitution.  The  first  amendments  were 
passed  in  1789 !  with  only  sixteen  out  of  twenty-six  Senators 
present  and  less  than  forty  out  of  fifty-nine  Representatives.  On 
May  i,  1802,  the  House,  consisting  of  a  hundred  and  six  mem- 
bers, had  passed  an  amendment  by  a  vote  of  47  to  14  and  the 
vote  the  previous  October  on  the  same  amendment  had  been  88 
to  31,  the  whole  number  of  Representatives  being  i4<D.2  This 
question  has  come  up  a  great  many  times  since  and  has  never 
been  settled  definitely,  though  in  practice  two-thirds  of  those 
present  has  been  considered  a  constitutional  majority.  The 
clause  relating  to  the  Vice-President's  assuming  the  duties  of  the 
President  in  case  of  a  non-election  by  the  House  gave  rise  to  a 
discussion.  Some  Republican  members 3  who  had  voted  for  the 
amendment  as  it  passed  the  House  now  joined  the  Federalists  in 
pointing  out  the  temptation  this  clause  held  out  to  the  Vice- 
President  to  prevent  an  election.  The  motion  was  made  to 
strike  out  everything  relating  to  that  officer  and  the  arguments 
advanced  in  the  Senate  were  repeated — showing  that  he  would 
no  longer  be  the  "  heir  apparent,"  4  but  merely  a  tool  to  assist  in 
the  election  of  the  President.  This  motion  was  lost,  and  the 
clause  in  question  was  retained  as  being  an  incentive  to  careful 
selection  of  vice-presidential  candidates  and  a  stimulus  to  the 
House  to  make  an  election  and  so  retain  their  constitutional 
privilege.  Such  a  non-election  was  contemplated  as  a  possibility 
in  i86o.5  It  was  hoped  by  Southern  members  of  the  Demo- 
cratic party  that,  though  it  would  be  an  impossibility  for  either 
Douglas,  Bell  or  Breckenridge  to  receive  an  electoral  majority, 
the  election  might  be  thrown  into  the  House.  There  Brecken- 
ridge might  be  chosen,  or  the  House  failing  to  make  a  choice, 
Lane  could  become  President  through  the  choice  as  Vice- 
President  by  the  Senate. 

The  antecedent  of  the  word  "  three  "  in  the  eligible  list  was 
long  and  tediously  discussed.  It  was  argued  on  the  one  hand 
that  the  word  referred  to  the  three  highest  numbers  of  votes 

1  Aug.  21,  1789,  in  House.     Sept.  9,  1789,  in  Senate. 

-  Annals  8th  Congress,  ist  session,  pp.  648,  650. 

3  Elliot  (Vt.),  Eustis  (Mass.)  4  8th  Congress,  ist  session,  p.  672. 

1  New  York  Tribune,  ]u\y  16,  1860. 


55 

containing  an  indefinite  number  of  persons,1  while  others  inter- 
preted it  to  mean  the  three  persons  having  the  highest  number 
of  votes.  It  was  on  this  idea  that  much  of  the  argument  in 
regard  to  the  small  States  had  been  based.  The  advocates  of 
the  amendment  were  not  agreed  on  the  subject,  but  were  willing 
to  grant  either  interpretation,  to  please  the  opposition.  The 
general  impression  was  that  it  referred  to  persons  rather  than  to 
numbers,  but  no  case  has  arisen  to  test  the  question.  Should 
such  a  case  occur  it  would  seem  that  the  word  must  have  refer- 
ence to  numbers.  Had  Clay  and  Crawford  received  an  equal 
number  of  electoral  votes  in  1824  ^  is  certain  that  neither 
would  have  been  excluded  from  the  House. 

Up  to  this  time  the  designating  principle,  as  such,  had 
hardly  been  discussed,  except  as  it  was  incidentally  connected 
with  other  points.  Now  it  was  attacked  by  the  Federalists  as 
destroying  the  eventual  succession  of  the  Vice-President 2  and  as 
equivalent  to  electing  the  President  for  life  3  by  tempting  him  to 
use  his  extensive  patronage  for  his  re-election.  This  was  only 
one  of  the  many  arguments  based  on  the  fear  of  corruption  of 
officials  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest.  The  fear  of  a  mon- 
archy ;  the  example  of  George  III.  in  enlarging  his  royal  pre- 
rogative so  enormously,  and  the  example  then  before  their  eyes 
of  the  seizure  of  power  by  Napoleon  combined  to  blind  them  to 
the  impossibility  of  such  an  occurrence  in  this  country.  Again, 
the  power  of  the  small  States  was  said  to  be  endangered  by  this 
principle.4  The  Republicans  answered  that  it  was  all  important 
that  the  process  of  election  be  pure  and  simple,  that  the  discrim- 
ination in  the  votes  gave  a  fair  expression  to  public  sentiment, 
and  compared  with  these  results,  it  was  of  little  consequence 
from  what  State  the  President  might  come. 

December  8th  the  vote  was  taken  on  the  Senate  resolutions 
and  they  were  concurred  in.5  Speaker  Macon  claimed  the  right 
to  vote  as  a  member,  thus  securing  the  necessary  two-thirds. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  things  noted  in  going  over  the 
debates  is  the  completeness  with  which  the  parties  change  sides 
on  the  question  of  State  Rights.  One  Federalist  made  the  dec- 
larationfi  that  the  Resolution,  by  impairing  the  rights  of  the 

1  Annals  8th  Congress,  pp.  671,  722.  4  Ibid,  p.  672. 

2  Ibid,  p.  732.  5  Ibid,  p.  748. 

;J>  Vote  :  83  yeas,  42  nays.  6  Thatcher  (Mass.). 


56 

small  States  in  choosing  the  President,  destroyed  the  basis  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  made  the  Constitution  a  nudum  pactum.  The 
most  extreme  grounds  on  both  sides,  however,  were  taken  by  the 
Republican,  Campbell  (Va.)  and  the  Federalist,  Dennis  (Md.). 
Campbell  argued  for  government  by  simple  majorities  and  antici- 
pated the  arguments  of  Webster  on  his  memorable  debate  with 
Hayne.  Starting  with  the  words,  "  We,  the  people  of  the  United 
States,"  he  argued  that  the  government  was  formed  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States  in  their  capacity  as  such,  by  their 
immediate  representatives  in  the  general  convention  and  not  by 
the  several  States  convened  in  their  State  capacities.1  This 
statement  had  about  as  much  historical  foundation  as  did  the 
statement  of  Webster  in  1830,  that  "  this  government  is  the 
independent  offspring  of  the  popular  will."  To  this  doctrine 
Dennis  replied  that  in  a  single  State  a  simple  majority  ought  to 
prevail,  but  he  denied  that  to  be  the  theory  at  the  basis  of  the 
Union.  He  declared  that  the  Constitution  was  not  adopted  by 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  but  by  the  people  of  the  several 
States,  as  such,  voting  through  the  medium  of  their  State  Con- 
ventions, and  so  far  from  having  been  adopted  by  the.  people  of 
the  United  States,  as  such,  it  was  doubtful  whether  it  was  not 
adopted  by  a  minority  of  the  people,  though  ratified  by  a  majority 
of  the  States.3 

Campbell  entirely  overlooked  the  Constitution  as  the  supreme 
of  the  land  and  advocated  the  doctrine  that  "  the  will  of  the 
people  should  be  supreme."  He  confounded  constitutional  with 
popular  majorities.  The  American  principle  is  that  the  former 
shall  rule  and  in  many  cases  they  do  not  at  all  coincide  with  the 
latter.  These  constitutional  majorities  differ  in  different  cases. 
The  most  striking  example  of  this  is  in  the  representation  in  the 
Senate,  and  to  a  less  degree  in  the  House,  due  to  the  fact  that 
each  State  must  have  at  least  one  representative.  Another  illus- 
tration is  in  the  change  from  a  simple  majority  to  a  two-third 
vote  necessary  to  pass  a  bill  over  a  veto  or  to  pass  an  amend- 
ment. Apart  from  the  federative  principle,  this  rule  of  consti- 
tutional majorities  must  be  preserved  for  the  protection  of  the 
minority.  It  is  an  essential  principle  in  the  political  life  of  the 
United  States  that  there  be  preserved  to  the  minority  the  nega- 

1  Ibid,  p.  718. 

2  Webster's  Works  (Ed.  1858),  III,  333.  3  Ibid,  p.  756. 


57 

tive  power  of  acting  as  a  brake  ;  the  conservative  power  by 
which  it  keeps  itself  from  being  crushed. 

Another  question  involved  in  the  amendment  was  that  of 
the  independence  of  the  electors.  The  intention  of  the  Conven- 
tion had  been  that  men  of  ability  and  discretion  should  be 
chosen  for  this  duty  and  that  they  should  exercise  this  discretion 
in  the  choice  of  President.  By  1800  they  had  begun  to  feel  the 
pressure  of  party  choice  as  almost  irresistible,  but  the  amend- 
ment, by  making  party  government  constitutional  and  impera- 
tive, completed  the  process  of  making  them  "  men  of  straw." 
Since  its  adoption  they  have  been,  as  a  usual  thing,  men  upon 
whom  it  was  desired  to  confer  some  honor,  but  beyond  that  they 
might  as  well  be  automata.  The  desire  expressed  by  Brecken- 
ridge  during  the  debates  that  the  choice  of  President  should  be 
made  directly  by  the  people  has  been  realized  to  an  extent  that 
would  have  gratified  James  Wilson  and  Gouverneur  Morris,  but 
would  have  caused  other  prominent  members  of  the  Convention 
of  1787  to  be  alarmed  at  what  they  denominated  the  "  Monster 
of  Democracy." 

Jefferson  expressed  the  opinion1  that  the  indication  caused 
by  the  efforts  of  the  Federalist  members  of  the  House  to  defeat 
the  well  known  wishes  of  the  country,  in  the  election  of  1801, 
had  a  greater  effect  in  one  week  in  bringing  the  great  body  of 
the  Federalists  into  sympsrfryywith  his  election  than  could  have 
been  effected  by  years  of  mild  and  impartial  administration. 
Whatever  the  cause,  the  prompt  ratification  of  the  amendment 
by  the  States  showed  their  realization  of  the  necessity  for  such 
a  measure.  As  soon  as  the  final  vote  was  taken  in  Congress  the 
amendment'  was  sent  to  the  Governors  of  the  States.  Before 
the  next  month  brought  in  the  New  Year  five  States  had  re- 
sponded. Kentucky  had  given  her  assent ; 2  Virginia  ratified 
with  only  one  dissenting  voice  in  the  House ; 3  North  Carolina 
had  no  opposition  in  the  Senate  and  but  eighteen  negative  votes 
in  the  House  of  Commons.4  In  Maryland  there  was  some  oppo- 
sition from  the  Federalists  in  the  House,  but  none  in  the  Senate 
in  the  ratification  on  December  3Oth,r>  and  Ohio  fulfilled  by 

1  Jefferson's  Writings,  VII,  494,  497. 

2  Acts  of  Kentucky,  i2th  General  Assembly  (1803),  pp.  109-111. 

3  National  Intelligencer,  Jan.  13,  1804.  *  Ibid,  Jan.  2,  1804. 

5  Ibid,  Jan.  n,  1804,  and  Laws  of  Maryland,  III,  ch.  LXV  (Session  Nov.  7, 
1803,  to  Jan.  7,  1804). 


prompt  ratification  l  the  expectation  of  Governor  Tiffin  who  had 
recommended  the  measure  in  his  message.2  A  few  days  after- 
wards, January  7,  1804,  Pennsylvania  followed  suit.3  In  Ver- 
mont there  was  some  heated  discussion  growing  out  of  the  fact 
that  Mr.  Elliot,  who  had  been  the  organ  of  the  House  in  sub- 
mitting to  Congress  their  desire  to  amend  the  Constitution, 
offered  a  letter  assigning  his  reasons  for  the  vote  he  had  given 
against  the  measure.  This  caused  a  repetition  of  the  arguments 
pro  and  con  which  had  been  given  in  Congress.4  The  constitu- 
tional question  of  the  majority  by  which  it  had  passed  was 
brought  up,  but  to  no  purpose.  On  January  ayth  the  Council 
unanimously  adopted  the  amendment,  and  the  House  passed  it 
by  a  good  majority. 

The  first  check  to  this  triumphant  progress  was  received  a 
little  before  this  in  Delaware.  January  6th  the  amendment  was 
laid  before  the  Legislature  by  Governor  Hall,*  with  an  urgent 
recommendation.  It  was  rejected  and  the  following  resolutions 6 
passed  instead  :  _"  Resolved  (etc.),  That  the  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  ....  be  and  the  same 
hereby  is  disapproved  by  the  Legislature  of  this  State  for  the 
reasons  following  : 

1.  Because  at  all  times  innovations  of  the   Constitution 
are  dangerous,  but  more  especially  when  the  .changes  are  dic- 
tated by  party  spirit,  are  designed  for  temporary  purposes  and 
calculated  to  accomplish  personal  views. 

2.  Because  as   representatives  of    a  small    State    we    are 
sensible  that  in  the  nature  of  things  every  chatige  in  the  Con- 
stitution will  be  in  favor  of  the  large  States  who  will  never  be 
disposed  to  allow  and  will  always  have  the  means  to  prevent  a 
variation  favorable  to  the  interests  of  the  small  States. 

3.  Because,  in  fact,  the  proposed  amendment  does  reduce 
the  power  and  weight  of  the  small  States,  in  the  case  provided 
by  the  Constitution  for  the  choice  of  President  by  the  House  of 
Representatives,  by  limiting  the  selection  to  three  instead  of 
five  candidates  having  the  greatest  number  of  electoral  votes. 

1  Laws  of  Ohio  (1803),  Ch.  II. 

2  National  Intelligencer,  Jan.  9,  1804. 

3  Laws  of  Pennsylvania  (1802-1805),  p.  181,  Chap.  MMCCCXCII. 

4  National  Intelligencer,  Feb.  loth,  Feb.  I3th,  1804. 

5  National  Intelligencer,  Jan.  30,  1804. 

15  Journal  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  Delaware,  1804,  Jan.  13,  p.  27. 


59 

4.  Because  the  present  mode  of  election  gives  to  the  small 
States  a  control  and  weight  in  the  election  of  President  which 
are  destroyed  by  the  contemplated  amendment. 

5.  Because  it  is  the  true  and  permanent  interest  of  a  free 
people  among  whom  the  relations  of  a  majority  and  a   minority 
must  ever  be    fluctuating,    to    maintain    the    just    weight    and 
respectability  of  the  minority,  by   every   proper  provision,  not 
impeaching  the  principle   that  the  majority  ought  to  govern  ; 
and  we  consider  the  present  mode  of  election  as  calculated  to 
repress  the  natural  intolerance  of  a  majority  and  to  secure  some 
consideration  and  forebearance  in  relation  to  the  minority. 

6.  Because  we  view  the  existing  provision  in  the  Consti- 
tution as  among  the  wisest  of  its  regulations.     History  furnishes 
many  examples  of  nations,  and  particularly  of  republics,  in  their 
delirious  devotion  to  individuals,  being  ready  to  sacrifice  their 
liberties  and   dearest  rights  to  the  personal  aggrandizement  of 
their  idol.    The  existing  regulation  furnishes  some  check  to  this 
human  infirmity  by  the  occasional  power  given  to  a  few  to  neg- 
ative the  will  of  the  majority  as  to  one  man,  leaving  them  every 
other  qualified   citizen   in   the  country   for  the    range   of  their 
selection. 

7.  Because  we  are  not  satisfied  that  the  said  amendment 
has  constitutionally  passed  the  two  houses  of  Congress  ;  the  Con- 
stitution requiring  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  both  houses, 
which  in   a   case  of  such   magnitude  and  designed  precaution 
must  be  considered  as  two-thirds  of  the  entire  number  composing 
the  two  houses  ;  whereas,  it  appears  that  the  said  amendment  is 
not   supported   by  the   concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  the  whole 
number  of  either  house." 

In  February,  Rhode  Island  ratified  by  a  unanimous  vote  in 
the  Senate  and  a  vote  of  42  to  18  in  the  House.1  In  a  letter 
from  Senator  Butler,  of  South  Carolina,  to  the  Governor  of  that 
State,  he  said  that  Governor  Fenner  of  Rhode  Island  was 
opposed  to  the  amendment,  but  some  Federalists  opposing  it 
also,  the  Republicans  said  it  must  be  a  good  thing,  so  pushed  it 
through.  During  the  same  month  Governor  Clinton  laid  the 
amendment  before  the  New  York  Legislature,2  and  it  was  agreed 
to  without  a  division  in  the  Senate  and  by  a  large  majority  in 

1  National  Intelligencer,  March  12,  1804. 

2  National  Intelligencer,  Feb.  13,  1804. 


6o 

the  House.1     New  Jersey,  also,  in  the  month  of  February,  sent 
in  her  ratification.2 

The  second  State  to  reject  the  amendment  was  Massa- 
chusetts. Governor  Strong,  in  his  presentation,  neither  recom- 
mended nor  condemned  it,  but  the  answer  of  the  House  gave 
an  indication  of  what  its  fate  would  be.  They  said  they  would 
pursue  the  discussion  of  the  subject  "  under  impressions  of  the 
highest  respect  and  veneration  for  an  instrument  so  valuable  as 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  deliberate  production 
of  our  first  and  long  tried  patriots,  united  with  our  most  enlight- 
ened and  experienced  statesmen." 3  It  was  said  during  the 
debates  that  it  was  "  high  time  for  a  *  union  of  all  honest  men  ' 
to  oppose  consolidation  and  appear  as  champions  of  the  small 
States."  On  February  ad,  the  amendment  was  rejected  in  the 
Senate,4  and  the  next  day  by  the  House.5  Connecticut  followed 
the  example  of  Massachusetts  and  rejected  it  on  May  24th,  by 
a  strict  party  vote.6 

In  Georgia,  Governor  Milledge  called  a  special  session  of 
the  Legislature,  which  met  at  Louisville  on  May  4th,  and  ratified 
it  unanimously.7  A  special  session  seems  to  have  been  called  in 
South  Carolina  also,8  and  Governor  Richardson  cited  the  events 
of  the  last  election  as  an  argument  for  ratification.  He  enclosed 
two  letters  from  Senator  Butler,  giving  his  reasons  for  voting 
against  the  amendment,  and  urging  South  Carolina  to  reject  it 
as  a  question,  not  of  party  politics,  but  of  State  rights.  In  spite 
of  this  protest  the  Legislature  ratified  it. 

In  New  Hampshire  the  question  had  been  brought  up  in  Jan- 
uary but  was  postponed  untill^June.  When  it  was  again  taken 
up,  it  passed  the  Senate  and  the  House,9  but  the  Governor 
vetoed  it  as  if  it  had  been  an  ordinary  bill.10  The  Legislature 

1  Vote  :  74  yeas,  14  nays.  Laws  of  New  York  (1804),  Ch.  IV,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  466. 

2  Acts  of  New  Jersey,  28th  Assembly,  2<d  session,  1803,  p.  284. 

3  National  Intelligencer,  Feb.  i,  1804. 

4  Vote  :  13  yeas,  19  nays. 

5  Vote  :  79  yeas,  132  nays. 

6  Vote  :  77  yeas,  115  nays.     National  Intelligencer,  June  6,  1804.     O'Neill  : 
"American  Electoral  System,"  p.  95. 

"  Laws  of  Georgia  (1801-1810),  No.  131,  p.  176. 

8  National  Intelligencer,  May  30,  1804. 

9  Vote  :  81  yeas,  73  nays. 

10  McMaster  :  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  III,  187.     Ames  : 
Proposed  Amendments,  p.  297. 


6i 

passed  it  again,  but  with  the  same  vote,5  which  was  not  the  two- 

P  thirds  majority  called  for  by  the  State  Constitution  to  override 

the  Governor's  veto.  Though  the  Republicans  of  the  State 
considered  that  the  Governor  had  no  part  in  the  ratification  of 
an  amendment  and  that  the  State  had  given  its  voice  in  favor  of 
this  one,  New  Hampshire  was  not  included  in  the  official  list  of 
ratifying  States. 

The  last  State  to  pass  upon  the  question  was  Tennessee, 
which,  on  July  27th,  ratified  with  perfect  unanimity  in  both 
Houses.1  Thus  of  the  seventeen  States,  thirteen,  not  including 
New  Hampshire,  had  voted  for  the  amendment,  and  this  being 
the  requisite  three-fourths,  on  September  25,  1804,  the  Secretary 
of  State  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  it  in  force.2  The  elec- 
tion of  1804-1805  was  held  in  accordance  with  its  provisions. 

5  National  Intelligencer,  June  29  ;  July  6,  1804. 

1  Ibid,  Aug.  15,  1804. 

2  For  copies  of  the  acts  of  ratification  of  the  States  see  "Bulletin  of  the 
Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library  of  the  Department  of  State,"  No.  7  (1894),  pp. 
408-451. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


Journal  of  Congress.     1775-1788. 

Secret  Journals  of  Congress.     1775-1788. 

Annals  of  Congress.     1789-1806. 

Elliot :  ''Journal  and  Debates  of  the  Federal  Convention."     1836  ;  1845. 

Poore  :  "The  Federal  and  State  Constitutions."     Washington,  1877. 

P.  L.  Ford  :  "  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution,  1787-88."     Brooklyn.     1888. 

McMaster  and  Stone  :  "Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal  Constitution,  1787- 
1788."  Philadelphia.  1888. 

Acts  of  Kentucky  :  i2th  General  Assembly.     1803. 

Acts  of  New  Jersey  :  28th  Assembly,  2d  Session.     1803. 

Laws  of  Maryland  :  Session,  Nov.  7,  1803 -Jan.  7,  1804. 

Acts  and  Resolves  of  Rhode  Island  :  February,  i8o3~October,  1806. 

Laws  of  Pennsylvania  :  1802-1805. 

Laws  of  Ohio  :  1803. 

Laws  of  New  York,  III :  1803-1804. 

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Journal  of  House  of  Representatives  of  Delaware.     1802-1805. 

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National  Intelligencer,  Washington.     1803-1805. 
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Pennsylvania  Gazette,  Philadelphia.     1788-1790. 
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New  York  Tribune,  New  York.     1860. 

Paine  :  "  Common  Sense."     1792. 

Pelatiah  Webster :  A  Dissertation  on  the  Political  Union  and  Constitution 
of  the  Thirteen  United  States  of  North  America."  By  a  citizen  of  Philadelphia. 
1783.  Republished  in  "  Political  Essays."  1791. 

Noah  Webster:  "Sketches  of  American  Policy."     1785. 
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Burr  and  a  Development  of  the  Character  and  Views  of  his  Political  Oppo- 
nents."    Philadelphia.     1803.     By  Aristides. 

Henry  Adams:  "  History  of  the  United  States  during  the  First  Adminis- 
tration of  Jefferson."  New  York.  1890. 

J.  B.  McMaster :  "  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States." 
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the  Writings  of  Alexander  Hamilton  and  his  Cotemporaries."     New  York. 
1857-60.  * 

Von  Hoist :  "Constitutional  History  of  the  United  States." 
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Burgess:  "Middle  Period,  1817-1850."  New  York.  1897. 


63 

Gibbs  :  "  Memoirs  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and  John  Adams." 
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Ramsay:  "  History  of  the  American  Revolution."     Philadelphia.     1789. 

McMahon  :  "History  of  Maryland."     Baltimore.     1831. 

American  Historical  Association  Reports.  1895.  B.  C.  Steiner :  "The 
Electoral  College  for  Maryland  and  the  Nineteen  Van  Buren  Electors."  Re- 
ports, 1896,  Ames:  "  Amendments  to  the  Constitution." 

Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies,  XIII.  J.  A.  Silver:  "Provisional  Gov- 
ernment of  Maryland,  1774-1777." 


Writings  of  Washington.     Putnam  Ed. 

Writings  of  Jefferson.     Putnam  Ed. 

Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King.     Putnam  Ed. 

Writings  of  Monroe.     Putnam  Ed. 

Works  of  John  Adams.     1856. 

Works  of  Hamilton,  1851  ;  Works  of  Hamilton.     Putnam  Ed. 

Works  of  Madison.     1865. 

Works  of  Daniel  Webster.     1858. 

Sparks  :  "  Life  and  Writings  of  Governeur  Morris."     Boston.  1832. 

Henry  Adams  :  "Life  of  Albert  Gallatin."     Philadelphia.     1879. 

Parton  :  "  Life  and  Times  of  Aaron  Burr."     New  York.     1858. 


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